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Abstract 
In this paper, we have analysed 166 book-building and fixed-price IPOs 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in 1993-2008 and compared the efficiency of 
two pricing mechanisms used in them (in terms of level and variability of 
underpricing, and the ability to fully incorporate market conditions in the pre-
offering period into the final offer price). After having controlled for firm, issue 
characteristics and market conditions in the period prior to an IPO, we have found 
that the book-building mechanism is associated with 5.2% significantly lower 
underpricing. It has also been found that book-building is less sensitive to market 
conditions prior to an IPO. Yet, both pricing mechanisms have the similar 
variability of underpricing, i.e. accuracy of pricing. All things considered, we 
conclude that book-building (vs. fixed-price) is a more efficient pricing 
mechanism in the Norwegian IPO market, as it underprices less, and more 
effectively incorporates market conditions in the pre-offering period into the final 
offer price. Thus, after controlling for all the other possible objectives of an IPO, 
different from pricing issues (e.g. allocation), book-building is a more rational 
pricing mechanism choice for Norwegian firms going public. 
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1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of initial public offering underpricing has been 
extensively studied in academic literature. Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) 
present a first comprehensive research on IPOs in an international perspective. 
They document that underpricing is present in roughly all IPOs globally, priced 
by means of different mechanisms.  
Loughran et al. (1994) argue that underpricing constitutes a cost to the 
issuer, and is not optimal since proceeds are “left on the table”. On the contrary, 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) claim that some positive amount of underpricing 
may, in fact, benefit the issuer. Nonetheless, there seem to be no clear 
recommendation of what level of underpricing is optimal, academic IPO literature 
clearly suggests that excessive underpricing is detrimental to the issuer, who is 
predominantly concerned with maximization of its IPO proceeds. Yet again, 
Loughran et al. (1994) were first to draw attention to the fact that one should 
consider a pricing mechanism used in the IPO when evaluating its success, 
measured by gross proceeds that are exposed to underpricing.    
The most noticeable research has been done in the strand of IPO literature 
that explains differences in IPO initial returns as a result of informational 
asymmetries that presumably exist amongst various parties involved in the IPO 
process. The way these informational asymmetries are handled by IPO pricing 
mechanisms, as we will see, is crucial. 
 As a general rule, parties involved in the IPO process include a firm going 
public (the issuer), a bank underwriting the issue (the underwriter) and investors. 
As there is obviously no secondary market so far for IPO shares, the issuer 
together with the underwriter need to determine the price of stocks to be issued. 
Three pricing mechanisms may be employed with the purpose of price 
determination. These mechanisms are book-building, fixed-price method, and 
auctions. 
IPO pricing methods differ considerably with respect to whether the price 
discovery occurs before or after the final offer price is set (Busaba and Chang, 
2010). For example, in the book-building process, which predominates in the 
United States and recently has spread to other parts of the world, noticeably 
Europe, the underwriter interacts with investors during the “road show”, where 
investors bid their non-binding indications of interest. This process allows the 
underwriter to learn the demand for the issue, and subsequently set the appropriate 
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offer price. In contrast, the “true” price evolves only after an offer is made if the 
fixed-price method is used. Naturally, therefore, a dissimilar structure of various 
pricing mechanisms results in their different treatment of informational 
asymmetries present in IPOs. In turn, this affects the underpricing associated with 
the issue. 
Growing theoretical literature on the topic gave rise to empirical tests of 
the superiority of one mechanism over another. The question is particularly 
interesting in countries, where more than one mechanism is available to price IPO 
shares, and thus they can be compared. Selected empirical evidence advocates for 
the superiority of auctions over book-building in terms of lower underpricing 
levels (Derrien and Womack (2003) for France; Kaneko and Pettway (2003) for 
Japan). Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) find that European book-built 
IPOs are more underpriced than fixed-price offerings, which contradicts most of 
the influential theoretical studies (Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Spatt and 
Srivastava (1991), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) and other). In a nutshell, 
both theoretical and empirical findings are so far inconclusive about whether one 
or another pricing mechanism efficiently dominates in terms of lower 
underpricing, and higher proceeds to the issuer. 
To our knowledge, the question is rather unexplored in the Norwegian IPO 
market, which provides the firms going public with two alternatives of the IPO 
pricing mechanisms – book-building and the fixed-price method. In our research, 
we compare their efficiency as measured by the level and variability of 
underpricing, as well as the ability to fully incorporate market conditions in the 
pre-offering period into the final offer price. Thus, our key research question is – 
what IPO pricing mechanism in Norway (book-building versus fixed-priced) is 
more efficient, i.e. underprices less, has higher accuracy of pricing, and is less 
sensitive to recent market conditions? In addition, we also explore what are the 
significant determinants of the pricing mechanism choice in Norwegian firms 
going public. To sum up, in our master thesis we attempt to bring so far inexistent 
empirical evidence on the question from Norway. 
In our paper, we have found that, after controlling for differences in firm, 
issue characteristics and market conditions prior to an IPO, book-building is on 
average associated with 5.2% significantly lower underpricing, than the fixed-
price mechanism. Secondly, both mechanisms have the very similar variability of 
underpricing, i.e. accuracy of pricing. Further, the analysis also suggests that the 
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book-building pricing mechanism effectively incorporates market conditions in 
the pre-offering period into the final offer price, while fixed-price mechanism is 
less effective, as market return in the period prior to an IPO has significant 
positive impact on both the level and variability of underpricing in fixed-price 
IPOs. 
It has also been found that the choice of pricing mechanism in Norwegian 
IPOs is contingent on a number of firm and issue characteristics. Higher book-to-
market and older firms, as well as the ones with higher fractions of shares to be 
created in an IPO, tend to choose the fixed-price method. In contrast, venture-
capital backed firms are more likely to opt for book-building (apparently because 
Norwegian venture capitalists prefer book-building IPOs as an exit vehicle). 
Larger companies are as well more likely to choose book-building (presumably in 
order to attract foreign investors who dislike fixed-price IPOs in which they get no 
advantages in shares allocation). Lastly, firms, which IPOs are going to be 
underwritten by highly ranked underwriters, are more likely to use book-building 
as a pricing mechanism (since highly ranked underwriters in Norway are 
specialized in this procedure, as we infer). 
All in all, we found empirical evidence in favour of a more efficient book-
building pricing mechanism in Norwegian IPO market, as it underprices less and 
is less sensitive to market conditions prior to an IPO than the fixed-price 
mechanism. In fact, the difference in underpricing is even more pronounced in 
“hot” market conditions. Thus, after controlling for all the other possible 
objectives of an IPO, different from pricing issues (e.g. allocation), book-building 
should be rationally opted for by Norwegian firms going public in order to 
maximize IPO proceeds. 
We will start with a review of the most relevant theoretical literature and 
selected empirical papers in the next section. Then, we will formulate testable 
hypotheses in section 3. The methodology used to investigate the issue will be 
outlined in section 4. Next, we will specify the data used, present the descriptive 
statistics and a cross-sectional analysis in section 5. Empirical evidence is 
presented in section 6. Lastly, we draw conclusions in section 7. 
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2. Literature Review 
We begin with the review of previous studies that are of the highest 
relevance to our research question. We will make an emphasis on theoretical 
models discussed in the literature to answer the question why underpricing arises 
in different pricing mechanisms, and whether it should be different. Further, 
selected empirical evidence on the question from other countries will be 
presented. Also, throughout this literature review, we will mostly focus on 
contrasting the pricing mechanisms. 
Rock (1986) presents one of the pioneering studies in the informational 
asymmetries and IPO underpricing literature. In his paper, Rock develops a model 
of a fixed-price method of IPO pricing, where he assumes the existence of a group 
of investors with pricing-relevant information, and the issuer is assumed to be 
unable to acquire this information before the offer price is set. There are no 
incentives for informed investors to reveal their information before the offer price 
is set and they can avoid participation in the overvalued IPOs. Conversely, 
uninformed investors cannot avoid participation in such IPOs, and as a result 
experience a winner‟s curse. He argues that underpricing is compensation to 
uninformed investors for experiencing the winner‟s curse, as informed investors 
crowd them out of the high quality offerings. He concludes that in order to 
guarantee that uninformed investors participate in the IPO, issued shares should 
be priced at a discount. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) study the book-building pricing mechanism. 
Clearly, in contrast to Rock (1986), the underwriter is now assumed to be able to 
obtain information from informed investors before the offer price is set. In their 
model, underpricing is compensation to investors for the disclosure of positive 
information about the issue. Thus, the underwriter‟s role is to mitigate the 
informational asymmetry by using his discretion over pricing and allocation that 
motivates investors to reveal their information about the issue. Investors reveal 
their information to the underwriter by bidding their non-binding indications of 
interest. Among other, they conclude that the new issue will be associated with 
less underpricing and respectively more proceeds to the issuer, compared to a 
fixed-price offer. 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) essentially extend the model of 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) by analysing the consequences of constraining the 
underwriters in their efforts to extract information from informed investors. 
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Underwriters maximize IPO proceeds by using a combination of price and 
allocation discrimination, given the opportunity to allocate shares among both 
regular (mostly informed institutional investors) and retail investors (mostly 
uniformed investors). Constraining underwriters in their efforts decreases the 
expected proceeds from the IPO by limiting the underwriter‟s ability to weaken 
the winner‟s curse. They argue that uniform-price restrictions increase the costs of 
gathering information from regular investors, and if they are combined with 
allocation restrictions, the underwriter appears to be no longer able to reduce the 
informational asymmetry because information gathering is impossible. At one 
extreme, when both uniform price and allocation restrictions are in place, the 
issuer may experience the consequences of the full winner‟s curse facing 
uninformed investors as in Rock (1986) and thus, book-building loses its 
advantages relative to the fixed-price mechanism. If not, they argue, book-
building is an efficient pricing method and dominates the fixed-price mechanism.  
Spatt and Srivastava‟s (1991) results are consistent with previous papers. 
They argue that the regular fixed-price procedure is inefficient since it does not 
utilize any information about investors‟ valuations. They further consider an 
augmented fixed-price mechanism by allowing informal communication between 
the underwriter and investors prior to the allocation of the issue. This 
communication, which resembles the book-building model in Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), can transmit relevant information between the parties. They 
conclude that the fixed-priced mechanism with a non-binding premarket 
communication, that provides an underwriter with indications of interest, leads to 
the allocation and pricing that maximizes issuer‟s expected proceeds, given the 
informational constraints. Thus, they actually support the notion of the efficient 
book-building mechanism.  
Welch (1992) focuses on the fixed-price mechanism and informational 
cascades. Under assumption that all investors possess equally valuable and 
correlated information, can observe each other‟s subscription decisions and their 
subscriptions are not simultaneously pro-rated, but instead served sequentially, he 
provides an explanation of IPO underpricing without a winner‟s curse (contrary to 
Rock, 1986). He argues that when an IPO is sold sequentially, later investors can 
learn from purchasing decisions of earlier investors, which can lead to 
informational cascades in which investors optimally ignore their private 
information and rely on and imitate the actions of earlier investors. Thus, in the 
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fixed-price mechanism underpricing is used to avoid information gathering and is 
needed in order to create a positive informational cascade. On the other hand, in 
the book-building procedure information about the demand is undisclosed by the 
underwriter to other investors. Therefore, informational cascades cannot develop, 
and less underpricing is required, ceteris paribus. 
Hanley (1993) provides evidence that the book-building procedure may be 
exposed to the partial adjustment phenomenon. She claims that issues associated 
with the partial adjustment phenomenon – those that have positive offer price 
revisions – exhibit both an increase in underpricing and the number of offered 
shares. This result is consistent with Benveniste and Spindt (1989) who claim that 
the final offer price is only partially adjusted to the information gathered through 
book-building. She argues that issues with the final offer price exceeding the 
limits of the price range have greater underpricing, ceteris paribus. Moreover, 
issuers and underwriters tend to price in the initially set price range. For that 
reason, the final offer price may not be sufficiently increased to capture the excess 
demand, which results in excess underpricing. 
Benveniste and Busaba (1997) theoretically compare fixed-price and 
book-building mechanisms under assumption that investors possess correlated 
information and can observe each other‟s subscription decisions. They model 
fixed-priced mechanism similarly to Welch (1992). As a result, in their setting 
book-building no longer stochastically dominates the fixed-priced mechanism as 
in Spatt and Srivastava (1991). They argue that underpricing required under the 
fixed-price procedure in order to create a positive informational cascade is larger 
than underpricing needed to induce investors to reveal information in book-
building. Therefore, book-building generates higher expected proceeds than the 
fixed-price method. However, it is as well associated with greater uncertainty. 
They conclude that it is the degree of price risk endogenous to the issue and risk-
aversion of the issuer that are the determinants of the issuer‟s choice of the pricing 
mechanism. They argue that the certainty of the proceeds is an advantage of the 
fixed-priced method, and for that reason, it may be attractive for more risk-averse 
issuers. Thus, they conclude that both the fixed-price and book-building may be 
optimal from the issuer‟s point of view, contingent on his characteristics. 
Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) develop a unified theoretical model in 
order to analyse and compare different pricing mechanisms. They provide 
evidence that the fixed-price mechanism leads to inefficient pricing of IPO shares 
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and a winner‟s curse (consistent with Rock, 1986), whereas auction mechanism 
can lead to inefficiencies due to implicit collusion among investors. Lastly, book-
building leads to the optimal information revelation from investors about their 
valuation of stocks and an efficient price discovery (consistent with Benveniste 
and Spindt, 1989). Thus, both auction and book-building methods are superior to 
the fixed-price mechanism. And unless there are inefficiencies caused by 
collusion among investors, auction and book-building procedures are equally 
efficient. 
Sherman and Titman (2002) further study the book-building mechanism of 
pricing IPO shares. They develop a model, in which an underwriter selects a 
group of targeted investors, pricing and allocation mechanisms that maximize the 
information generated during the IPO process subject to a minimum cost. In 
contrast to previously discussed papers (most notably Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989), they argue that underpricing in book-building is needed so as to induce 
investors to produce information, rather than reveal it. Therefore, investors 
experience a cost of acquiring information, which should be compensated by 
corresponding underpricing. They conclude that when there is no need in accurate 
pricing, the expected gain from underpricing exactly offsets the costs of acquiring 
information by investors. However, when pricing accuracy is of high importance, 
the number of participating investors, as well as amount of underpricing increases, 
and on average underpricing will go above the information acquisition costs 
encountered by investors. Thus, the firms with a high need for pricing accuracy 
(e.g. riskier firms, smaller size firms with potentially less liquid shares, firms with 
significant future capital needs) are likely to be more underpriced. 
Ljungqvist, Jenksinson and Wilhelm (2003) perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of the global integration of IPO markets and a followed-on adoption of 
the US-style book-building mechanism throughout 65 countries in 1990s, where 
the fixed-price method dominated until then. They find that on average, both 
pricing mechanisms are associated with the similar level of underpricing – around 
20%. They argue that book-building on its own does not lead to lower 
underpricing. However, book-building leads to significantly lower underpricing 
relative to the fixed-price method, or book-building by domestic underwriters if 
only it is conducted by US underwriters or targeted at US investors. Even though 
it is twice as much expensive as the fixed price mechanism, gains associated with 
it – decreased underpricing – outweigh additional direct costs of hiring a US 
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underwriter or targeting at a US investor. They explain this due to longer book-
building experience of US banks that seem to be better at rewarding investors for 
revealing information dynamically. What is more, they find that European book-
built IPOs are more underpriced than fixed-price offerings. However, these results 
may be due to the fact that the issuer chooses the pricing mechanism 
endogenously, depending on her characteristics. Sectors with high degrees of 
informational asymmetry (e.g., IT and biotech) may benefit from either 
information production (as in Sherman and Titman, 2002) or revelation (as in 
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) in the course of book-building. 
In their paper, Derrien and Womack (2003) investigate empirically IPO 
pricing mechanisms and underpricing based on the French IPO market, where all 
the three pricing mechanisms, namely auctions, book-building and fixed-price 
offers are used. They focus their research not exclusively on the amount of 
underpricing, but also on the variability of underpricing, which are both related to 
previous market conditions, as they show. They argue that cross-sectional 
variance of underpricing is another important aspect of the efficiency of pricing 
mechanisms. They find that amongst all the mechanisms, the auction method is 
associated with lesser amount and variance of underpricing, thus it is superior to 
both book-building and fixed-price mechanisms. They argue that its auctions 
mechanism‟s ability to incorporate information on current and previous market 
conditions into the final offer price that is the reason for its superiority. Book-
building appears to be the second-best alternative that may be opted for because of 
other objectives different from reduced underpricing, for example, a better-
selected set of owners. 
Kaneko and Pettway (2003) present a study of IPOs in Japan, which 
moved from an auction-priced to underwriter-priced IPOs using book-building 
mechanism in 1997. In line with Derrien and Womack (2003), they find evidence 
that initial returns of the book-built IPOs are significantly higher than those of the 
auctions, especially in “hot” market conditions. They relate higher underpricing of 
the book-built IPOs to the setting of the upper price limit by the underwriter too 
low at the stage of registering preliminary prospectus, and typical setting of the 
final offer price no higher than the upper bound of the price range by underwriters 
of the Japanese IPOs, despite the fact that the demand function learned through 
book-building suggests a higher appropriate price. 
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Most of the previously reviewed studies assume that the “true” value of 
offered shares is established instantly after trading begins (e.g., Benveniste and 
Wilhelm, 1990; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Benveniste and Busaba, 1997; Biais 
and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002). On the contrary, Busaba and Chang (2010) analyse 
book-building and fixed-price mechanisms allowing for strategic aftermarket 
trading by informed investors. They find that both methods require more 
underpricing when informed investors consider aftermarket trading. This is 
particularly true for the book-building procedure, which becomes especially costly 
since investors‟ bidding behaviour is adversely affected by the potential for profits 
in aftermarket. Underpricing is thus required to offset the losses of uniformed 
investors who face trading with informed investors in aftermarket. They argue that 
dominance of the book-building procedure may be established if only the 
discretion to limit participation in the premarket is added to discretion to condition 
allocations (discussed in Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990). Thus, in contrast to 
previous studies, that at large document the superiority of the book-building 
method, they argue that the fixed-price mechanism produces on average higher 
expected proceeds, unless the underwriter can target its book-building activity to a 
small subset of informed investors. Thus, they found an efficiency rationale of the 
common practice in book-built US IPOs to limit the book-building activity to a 
group of institutional informed investors. 
In sum, theoretical studies suggests that the “nature” of underpricing in 
fixed-price and book-building IPOs is rather different. Underpricing in fixed-price 
offerings either serves as a compensation for winner‟s curse, or is used to create 
informational cascades. On the contrary, in book-building IPOs, underpricing is 
used to induce investors to either reveal or produce information, to offset losses 
that investors face in the aftermarket trading, or arises as a result of only partial 
adjustment of the offer price. In turn, theory also predicts that underpricing due to, 
for instance, information revelation in book-building should be lower than 
underpricing in fixed-price offerings due to winner‟s course or creation of 
informational cascades. In contrast, empirical studies suggest that European book-
built IPOs are in fact more underpriced than fixed-price offerings. Price and/or 
allocation restrictions, or inability to limit participation in the premarket, are the 
possible reasons why book-building mechanism may lose its superiority over the 
fixed-price method. 
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3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we postulate three sets of hypotheses that correspond to 
three characteristics of the efficient pricing mechanism, i.e. low underpricing, low 
variability of underpricing (i.e. higher pricing accuracy), and the ability to fully 
incorporate market conditions in the pre-offering period into the final offer price.  
The traditional standpoint of IPO pricing mechanisms efficiency virtually 
supports the notion of the efficient book-building pricing mechanism. It origins 
from the most notable theoretical works of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava (1991), and it is supported 
by later studies of Benveniste and Busaba (1997), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 
(2002). For the most part, they all agree that book-building efficiently dominates 
the fixed-price method, as the underwriter during the course of it reduces 
informational asymmetries and weakens the winner‟s course by utilizing the 
information disclosed by investors. Thus, book-building is associated with less 
underpricing, and respectively more proceeds to the issuer. Our central hypothesis 
is thus inspired by their works and is formulated in the following manner: 
 
H1. On average, those IPOs that are priced using the book-building 
mechanism are associated with less underpricing, compared to fixed-priced 
offerings. 
 
In contrast to a conventional viewpoint, Busaba and Chang (2010) argue 
that on average, the fixed-price mechanism produces higher expected proceeds, 
unless the underwriter can target its book-building activity to a small subset of 
informed investors. Also, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) find 
empirically that European book-built IPOs are more underpriced than fixed-priced 
offerings (Norwegian IPOs are not included in their sample). Therefore, we 
formulate the competing hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2. On average, those IPOs that are priced using the fixed-price 
mechanism are associated with less underpricing, compared to book-built 
offerings.     
 
In their paper, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) also find that on 
average in their sample (including European IPOs; Norway is not included), both 
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book-building and fixed-price mechanisms are associated with the similar level of 
underpricing – around 20%. Thus, we also consider the possibility that there may 
be no significant relation between the pricing mechanism used in an IPO and its 
consequent underpricing in the Norwegian IPO market. This is our null 
hypothesis. 
 As Derrien and Womack (2003) argue, low cross-sectional variance of 
underpricing is another important aspect of the pricing mechanism efficiency in 
addition to low underpricing since underwriters are also typically concerned about 
controlling the aftermarket price variation, particularly the downside potential. 
This matter was as well addressed by Busaba and Chang (1997), who suggest that 
the book-building mechanism is associated with greater aftermarket uncertainty. 
We therefore formulate the following two hypotheses to assess this aspect of the 
pricing efficiency: 
 
H3. On average, those IPOs that are priced using the book-building 
mechanism are associated with a lower variance of underpricing, compared to 
fixed-price offerings.     
H4. On average, those IPOs that are priced using the fixed-price 
mechanism are associated with a lower variance of underpricing, compared to 
book-built offerings.     
 
Lastly, following Derrien and Womack (2003), we also hypothesise that 
recent market conditions prior to an IPO have a differential impact on the level 
and variability of underpricing in book-building and fixed-price IPOs. Therefore, 
we formulate: 
 
H5. On average, book-building mechanism is more sensitive to market 
conditions in the pre-offering period, compared to the fixed-price pricing 
mechanism. 
H4. On average, the fixed-price mechanism is more sensitive to market 
conditions in the pre-offering period, compared to the book-building pricing 
mechanism. 
 
Having postulated the hypotheses, we describe the methodology in the 
next section. 
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4. Methodology 
 In this section, the methodology used in our research will be outlined. We 
start with the introduction of dependent variables of interest, as well as 
explanatory variables used. Next, the stages of the empirical research and 
corresponding models will be presented. We conclude this section with the 
discussion of statistical tests we employ in the models to check the reliability of 
obtained results. 
4.1. Dependent variables 
The central objective of the current research is to test empirically the 
efficiency of the book-building method versus fixed-price mechanism in 
Norwegian IPOs, measured by the level and variability of underpricing. We 
quantify the level of underpricing as the first-day return level. The variability of 
underpricing is measured by both the conditional and unconditional variances of 
the first-day return. The construction of the three dependent variables is presented 
in details below.  
The level of underpricing is measured by the first-day return. Following 
the conventional definition, for each IPO in the sample, we compute the first-day 
return as a simple return, or a percentage difference, between the offer price and 
the closing price on the first day of trading. 
The Unconditional variance of the first-day return is a measure of the 
variability of underpricing without controlling for differences in underpricing that 
might be introduced by dissimilarities in firm, issue characteristics and recent 
market conditions prior to an IPO. For each IPO in the sample, we compute the 
unconditional variance of underpricing as a squared deviation of the first-day 
return around mean underpricing in the cross-section of either book-building or 
fixed-price IPOs (depending on the pricing mechanism used in the IPO in 
question). 
The Conditional variance of the first-day return is a measure of variability 
of underpricing after controlling for differences in underpricing introduced by 
dissimilarities in firm, issue characteristics and market conditions before an IPO. 
For each IPO in the sample, we construct the conditional variance of underpricing 
as squared residuals from the multivariate regression model with the First-day 
return as a dependent variable, and firm, issue characteristics and recent market 
conditions as independent covariates. In effect, the conditional variance of first-
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day return is, for each observation, a squared difference between actual 
underpricing of the issue, and underpricing, predicted by the regression model, 
specified above. 
4.2. Explanatory variables 
 Previous studies suggest that many firm and issue characteristics are 
inevitably linked with the ex-ante uncertainty associated with an IPO, and 
therefore, they should have a significant impact on underpricing (Kaneko and 
Pettway, 2003). In addition, market conditions prior to an IPO are also found to 
have a significant effect on the first-day return (Derrien and Womack, 2003). In 
this subsection we outline a comprehensive set of variables used in the current 
research, and that serves two purposes. Firstly, we study whether the relationships 
between firm, issue, market conditions variables and first-day returns, found in 
previous studies, are also present in Norwegian IPOs. Secondly (and more 
importantly), these variables are also used as control variables when first-day 
return levels, as well as variances of underpricing, are compared across book-
building and fixed-price IPOs. 
The company-specific variables in question are market capitalization, the 
book-to-market ratio, age, industry, venture capital investment. Issue 
characteristics are its size, underwriter reputation, and insider sales. Two moments 
of market conditions are market return and volatility prior to a listing date. The 
definitions of the variables, their construction, along with the underlying rationale 
of their link with first-day return, are presented below. 
Company-specific variables 
Market capitalization (or market value of equity) is a measure of the 
market size of the IPO firm. To avoid any mechanical relationships with 
underpricing, we calculate initial market capitalization (at the beginning of the 
first day of trading) as a total number of company shares (total post-issue shares) 
times the offer price. Companies with higher market size are usually exposed to 
higher analyst coverage during the IPO process, which leads to a decline in 
informational asymmetries. As these companies become less ex-ante uncertain, 
we expect a negative relationship between market capitalization and the first-day 
return level. For the regression analysis purpose, we take the natural logarithm of 
the variable to improve its distributional characteristics, in particular large positive 
skewness. 
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A Book-to-market ratio is also calculated at the IPO date as a ratio of book 
value of equity to initial market capitalization. Firms with lower book-to-market 
ratios are associated with higher informational asymmetries (Brav and Gompers, 
2000), therefore we expect there to be an inverse relationship between the book-
to-market ratio and underpricing. Logarithmic transformation has been applied to 
this variable as well.    
Age of company is measured in a number of full years between a funding 
date and a listing date. Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that older companies are 
considered less ex-ante uncertain, and thus, there should be a negative relationship 
between firm‟s age and first-day return. We will test whether this finding applies 
to Norwegian companies as well. 
We construct a high-tech dummy variable to control for industry-specific 
effects. We classify a company as being high-tech if it belongs to either IT or the 
Telecommunications sector. High-tech firms are associated with higher levels of 
informational asymmetries, and more complicated pricing. Therefore, they should 
be on average more underpriced than non-high-tech companies. We also construct 
a venture capital-backed dummy variable encoded as 1 if a company at a listing 
date had venture capital investment and 0 otherwise. Baker and Gompers (1999) 
argue that venture capitalists reduce informational asymmetries in firms they invest. 
Hamao et al. (2000) also find that the presence of venture capital investment 
negatively affects the level of underpricing in Japan. We will investigate whether 
venture capitalist ownership also affects first-day returns in Norwegian IPOs. 
 Issue-specific variables 
We define the Issue size as gross proceeds of the IPO, and calculate it as 
the final offer price times the number of shares sold in an IPO. Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) and Ibbotson et al. (1994) argue that there should be an inverse 
relationship between the issue size and level of first-day return as the larger issue 
size entails lower ex-ante uncertainty. We apply a logarithmic transformation to 
this variable to deal with high positive skewness. 
We measure Underwriter’s reputation based on capital levels, rather than 
on the number of IPOs as Derrien and Womack (2003)1. For each IPO in the 
                                                 
1 In our sample, there are underwriters that were involved in a relatively small number of IPOs; 
however, the cumulative deal value of those IPOs is relatively high. If one measures the 
underwriter reputation based on the number of IPOs, these underwriters will be assigned an 
unreasonably low rank, which, we believe, does not truly represent their reputation level. 
Consequently, we use capital levels as a proxy for underwriter reputation. 
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sample, we determine the identity of the underwriter. Next, each underwriter is 
assigned a group of IPOs in which he was a lead underwriter. We then compute 
the cumulative IPO gross proceeds in each underwriter‟s group, as well as total 
gross proceeds for all IPOs. Based on this data, we compute each underwriter‟s 
market share2. For regression purposes, we calculate the underwriter‟s reputation 
as follows: 
                                                           
Also, for the sake of easier interpretation, we assign each underwriter a 
rank, with 1 being the highest, based on his respective market share. Carter et al. 
(1998) argue that an underwriter‟s reputation provides a credible ex-ante 
uncertainty signal to new investors about the quality of the issue and its embedded 
risk. Higher-ranked underwriters should therefore underwrite higher-quality issues 
with eventually lower underpricing levels3. 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that company insiders selling their 
shares in an IPO implicitly provide an unfavourable signal to new investors, 
which increases ex-ante uncertainty of the IPO. Consequently, as they suggest, 
there should be an inverse relationship between insider sales and the first-day 
return. In our research, we would like to test two distinct features of the presence 
of insider sales in an IPO – whether the fact of insider sales alone provides such 
an unfavourable signal to investors, or the volume of insider sales is also 
important factor. For this reason, we construct “No insider sales” dummy encoded 
as 1 if no secondary shares were sold in an IPO and 0 otherwise. Then, for 
companies with non-zero insider sales (dummy variable equal to 0), we construct 
the Volume of insider sales variable as a percentage of secondary shares (shares 
previously owned by insiders and sold in an IPO) as of total primary and 
secondary shares sold in an IPO. We also logarithmically transform it4. 
 
                                                 
2 In our calculations we implicitly assume that underwriter‟s market share has not changed during 
the period concerned. In general, this assumption holds in our sample: underwriters with high 
market share in the past also have a high market share in the future. 
3 Another explanation for decreased underpricing may arguably be that highly ranked underwriters 
are better skilled at pricing IPOs, and other things equal, are able to secure larger proceeds to firms  
4 In the pilot study, Ln (Volume of insider sales) was not a significant variable in both the single 
regression model, and multivariate regression model with firm, issue characteristics and market 
conditions as explanatory variables, and first-day return as a dependent variable. On the contrary, 
“No insider sales” dummy had significant explanatory power. We conclude that in Norwegian 
IPOs, the fact of insider sales alone constitutes an unfavourable signal and increases the first -day 
return, but the volume of insider sales seems to have no significant impact  on underpricing. To 
make our regressions more parsimonious, we exclude Ln (Volume of insider sales) from the 
analysis hereafter. 
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Market conditions 
Ritter (1984), Ibbotson et al. (1994), Benveniste et al. (2003) all find that 
recent market conditions prior to an IPO affect the level of underpricing 
associated with the issue. Further, Derrien and Womack (2003) in their study of 
French IPOs also find that recent market conditions significantly affect the 
variability of first-day return. To capture market conditions prior to a listing date, 
we construct market return and volatility variables.  
In order to benchmark market conditions, we use price series of Oslo 
Stock Exchange All-share Index (OSEAX). It is a value-weighted market index 
that consists of all shares listed on Exchange and is adjusted for corporate actions 
(e.g. dividends) daily. We assume log-distribution of returns and continuous 
compounding, and compute daily log-returns for each trading day. By convention, 
we also assume 252 trading days in a year. Then, for each IPO in the sample, we 
use daily returns to construct Market return variable as three-month-weighted 
average buy-and-hold return prior to an IPO5. We hypothesize that investors take 
into account market return in three months prior to an IPO (or 21*3=63 trading 
days), but they care more about returns in more recent months. For this reason, we 
assign weight of 3 to the most recent month (or most recent 21 trading days), and 
weights of 2 and 1 to the second and third next months prior to an IPO, 
respectively. We then divide the computed weighted sum by 6 to obtain a measure 
of return in monthly terms. Market volatility variable is computed as a standard 
deviation of daily log-return over 21 trading days prior to a listing date6. 
Pricing mechanism dummy variable 
For each IPO in the sample, this variable is coded 1 if book-building as a 
pricing mechanism was used in an IPO and 0 if the fixed-price method was 
employed. This variable is by far of the highest interest to us, since it is used to 
investigate whether underpricing or variance of underpricing across book-building 
and fixed-price IPOs differs significantly after controlling for all the covariates 
mentioned above. 
After having discussed the variables used in the research, we continue with 
the description of its stages and corresponding models.  
                                                 
5 In the pilot study, we also explored three other lengths of the pre-offering period, in which 
market conditions could possibly affect first-day returns (in particular, 1-week, 1-month, non-
weighted 3-months). We chose to proceed with the one in which market conditions had the most 
significant impact on underpricing 
6 Since we are averse to underestimating market volatility, we calculate the corrected sample 
standard deviation (Bessel‟s correction).  
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4.3. Stages of the empirical research and models 
Stage I. Investigation of differences between book-building and fixed-
price IPOs 
In order to study the differences between book-building and fixed-price 
IPO firms and their respective issues, we will examine and compare the 
descriptive statistics of the subsamples of fixed-price and book-building IPOs 
based on variables, outlined in the previous section. Among others, mean and 
median levels of first-day return, as well as its variability, in book-building and 
fixed-priced IPOs will be computed and statistically compared.  
On this stage (and throughout the paper), we employ a number of 
statistical tests. To test whether the subsample means are different, we firstly 
perform Levene‟s test for equality of variances. Then, depending on the test 
results, we perform either Two-tail t-test assuming equal variances (if we find that 
variances are equal) or Two-tail t-test assuming unequal variances otherwise. To 
compare medians across subsamples, we use Non-parametric median test. Finally, 
to compare proportions expressed as percentages, Chi-squared test is performed. 
Significances of corresponding tests will be indicated in the tables. 
Stage II. Analysis of cross-sectional differences in the level and 
variability of underpricing in the subsamples of book-building and fixed-
price IPOs 
After having examined the differences between fixed-price and book-
building IPOs, we further investigate whether there are any cross-sectional 
differences with respect to the level and variability of underpricing within the 
cross-sections of fixed-price and book-building IPOs individually. We will split 
the subsamples into subgroups based on pre-defined criteria (e.g., market 
capitalization >= median versus market capitalization < median, or high-tech 
versus non-high-tech firms). Each IPO in the subsample is next placed into one of 
these subgroups. Then, the mean first-day return and mean variance of first-day 
return in subgroups are computed and statistically compared. 
Stage III. Regression analysis 
On this stage, we run a set of multivariate regression models. We firstly 
investigate and compare the relationships between underpricing, variability of 
underpricing and suggested firm, issue and market conditions variables, on the 
subsamples of book-building and fixed-price IPO separately. We run the 
following multivariate regression models: 
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(Set of models #1) 
                                                                       
                                                                   
                                                          
                                                             
(Also, two more regressions with the same set of independent variables, 
but with Unconditional variance of first-day return and Conditional variance of 
first-day return as dependent variables) 
 
Then, we proceed with by far the most important part of our research. In 
order to provide evidence whether the level and/or variability of underpricing 
differs between the fixed-price and book-building IPOs after controlling for the 
likely effects of the characteristics of the firm, the issue, and previous market 
conditions, we use a dummy variable approach. We run regressions on the joint 
sample of fixed-price and book-building IPOs with a pricing mechanism dummy 
and a set of controls as independent variables. The regression models are as 
follows: 
(Set of models #2) 
                      ∑                                     
  
   
 
                                
(Also, two more regressions with the same set of independent variables, 
but with Unconditional variance of first-day return and Conditional variance of 
first-day return as dependent variables) 
 
After having performed the main part of the analysis, we will then test 
whether there is a differential impact of market conditions on first-day return level 
and variability in book-building and fixed-price IPOs. We do it by splitting 
market return and volatility variables by the pricing procedure. As Derrien and 
Womack (2003), we multiply market return and volatility variables by 
corresponding procedure dummies to construct four new variables. The following 
regression models on the joint sample are constructed (Book_building = 1 for 
book-building and Fixed_price = 1 for fixed-price mechanism, and 0 otherwise): 
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(Set of models # 3) 
                      ∑                   
 
   
 
                             
                                                               
                                                                          
(Also, two more regressions with the same set of independent variables, 
but with Unconditional variance of first-day return and Conditional variance of 
first-day return as dependent variables) 
 
Stage IV. Implementation of the pricing mechanism choice 
endogeneity 
As Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue, the findings from regression 
analysis with a pricing mechanism dummy (in particular, the set of models #3 in 
our case) may be possibly biased if a pricing mechanism choice is endogenous. 
Thus, on this stage we will test and implement the endogeneity of the pricing 
mechanism choice, following the methodology of Jenkinson, Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm (2001) and Derrien and Womack (2003). 
We will employ the two-stage least squares procedure. On the first stage, 
we will use variables, exogenous with respect to underpricing (the ones that 
turned out to be insignificant determinants of underpricing in the set of models 
#3) as predictor variables in the multinomial logistic model with a pricing 
mechanism dummy as a dependent variable. We will then use the obtained logistic 
regression model coefficients to predict the probabilities of choosing book-
building (versus fixed-price) for each IPO in the sample.  
Next, in the second stage regressions, we substitute the pricing mechanism 
dummy variable in the set of models #3 with the predicted probabilities from first-
stage logistic regression and run the same set of models. This will allow us to 
check whether our findings still hold after the implementation of endogenous 
pricing mechanism choice. 
Having controlled for endogeneity, we additionally explore whether other 
firm or issue characteristics variables (not used on the first stage in the two-stage 
least squares model above) may also determine the choice of the procedure in 
Norwegian IPOs. We therefore run an extra multinomial logistic regression model 
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with the pricing mechanism dummy as a dependent variable, and these variables 
as predictor covariates. 
Stage V. Analysis of first-day return differences in “hot” versus 
“cold” markets 
Since the common variable that supposedly has an impact on first-day 
return in fixed-price and book-building IPOs is market return prior to a listing 
date, we will complete the empirical analysis with the study of first-day return 
differences in various market conditions, particularly “hot” versus “cold” markets.  
For every trading day from January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2008, 
we compute a series of three-month-weighted buy-and-hold previous market 
returns, ending on this day, and rank it in an ascending order. Next, the obtained 
series is divided into quintiles of approximately the same number of market return 
observations. We then assign every IPO in the sample into one of the market 
“hotness” quintiles, with first being the “coldest” one, and fifth being the 
“hottest”. The impact of “hot” versus “cold” markets is then analysed in terms of 
computed average first-day return levels and the number of IPOs in each quintile, 
also splitting by the pricing mechanism. 
4.3. Testing the reliability of regression results 
In the major part of the empirical research, the regression analysis is 
carried-out. To make sure that obtained results are reliable, we test whether 
assumptions of the OLS procedure are met. The key tests we perform will be 
briefly outlined here. 
Each regression model is firstly tested for heteroskedasticity using White‟s 
heteroskedasticity test. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, White‟s algorithm is 
applied to obtain corrected standard errors, which results in more conservative 
hypothesis testing. However, as we have noticed, reporting heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and t-statistics has become a matter of routine in 
econometrics and finance. We therefore at all times report heteroskedasticity-
consistent t-statistics throughout the paper.  
Next, as we carry-out the regression analysis on the cross-sectional data 
without any time component, we perform no profound testing for serial 
correlation. Nevertheless, we are aware that autocorrelation may occur as a result 
of spatial ordering of observations in the sample. 
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We further examine bivariate correlations between independent variables 
to detect a possible multicollinearity issue in regressions. The Correlations matrix 
in Appendix 9.3 indicates that, as expected, high bivariate correlation of 0.736 
exists between variables Ln (Issue size) and Ln (Market capitalization). In the 
pilot study, we ran regressions with either of them, and found that our results are 
neither qualitatively nor quantitatively affected. Further, we also computed 
variance inflation factors to assess the extent of possible multicollinearity. No 
severe multicollinearity has been found in regressions. Thus, in order to avoid the 
omitted variable bias, we include both of them in our models. 
Finally, we perform Jarque-Bera normality test to assess the distribution of 
residuals. Even though we have applied logarithmic transformation to several 
variables in order to deal with large positive skewness, in the pilot study we had to 
reject the null hypothesis of normality at 5% level. Other data-mining techniques 
(e.g. excluding outliers in the sample) might only artificially improve the overall 
model fit. Therefore, we decide to proceed with our analysis by taking into 
account the fact that non-strict normality of residuals might have an effect on 
regression estimates.  
Having described the methodology, we will present the data used in the 
next section. 
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5. Data 
We begin this section with the presentation of sample selection process 
and the descriptive statistics of the subsamples of book-building and fixed-price 
IPOs, as well as the whole sample. Then, time trends in IPO activity and 
underpricing will be examined. Finally, we will explore the cross-sectional 
differences in underpricing and its variability in book-building and fixed-price 
IPOs.  
5.1. Sample selection 
For the purpose of the current research, we construct a sample of 
Norwegian fixed-price and book-building initial public offerings. Our primary 
sources of data are a dataset of equity offerings on Oslo Stock Exchange and 
corresponding prospectuses that contain information on firm and issue 
characteristics (both kindly provided by the Department of Financial Economics 
at BI Norwegian Business School). The database in question contains 587 equity 
offerings from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2008. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the sample selection process. 
 
Table 1 Sample selection process 
  No. of issues 
Initial dataset 587 
Excl. secondary, tertiary offerings etc. 163 
Excl. employee offerings, mergers, private placements etc. 183 
Excl. cross-listed, OTC traded offerings etc. 33 
Excl. issues where pricing mechanism is unspecified 36 
Excl. offerings that dropped 2 
Excl. issues with missing and non-recoverable data 4 
Final sample 166 
 
From the initial dataset of 587 offerings, we firstly exclude issues that are 
not initial (e.g. secondary, tertiary offerings etc., 163 issues in total), and then 
issues that are not public offerings (e.g. employee offerings, mergers, private 
placements etc., 183 issues in total). We further eliminate IPOs that were priced 
by methods, other than the fixed-price mechanism or book-building (as well as 
cross-listed, OTC traded IPOs because these issues already have market valuation 
prior to an IPO; 33 issues in total). Then, 36 issues were excluded since the 
pricing method used in them was not specified. We also eliminate 2 offerings that 
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eventually dropped. And lastly, we exclude 4 issues for which data was 
significantly missing and could not be recovered due to missing prospectuses.  
In effect, we will analyse 166 Norwegian equity offerings, initially listed 
on Oslo Stock Exchange during the period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 
2008, priced by means of the fixed-price mechanism (79 issues) and book-
building (87 issues)7. 
From the IPO dataset and prospectuses, we collect the following 
information on company and issue characteristics: age of the company, industry, 
venture-capital backing, book value of equity, number of shares created in an IPO, 
number of secondary shares sold in an IPO, total number of outstanding shares, 
fraction of company sold, identity of the lead underwriter, offer price and closing 
price on the first day of trading etc., which we use to construct the variables, 
discussed in previous section. The market data (OSEAX index price series for the 
period from 1993 to 2008) is obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database. 
5.2. Descriptive statistics 
In order to summarize the data and compare a typical book-building and 
fixed-price IPO, we present the descriptive statistics of IPOs in our sample in 
Table 2. Columns 3 and 4 provide values for book-building and fixed-price IPOs, 
respectively, while column 5 indicates the significance level of statistical 
difference between them. One may notice that means are considerably higher than 
medians for some of the variables8. We will therefore mostly use median 
measures to describe a typical firm in the sample.  
As Table 2 shows, there are comparable numbers of book-building and 
fixed-price IPOs (87 and 79, respectively) in the sample. Our typical book-
building IPO firm has larger market size than a fixed-price IPO firm. It has market 
capitalization at IPO date of roughly 1,071 million NOK, which is significantly 
higher (at 1% level) than the market size of the fixed-price IPO firm of 344 
                                                 
7 Not surprisingly, the final sample size is smaller than the one used by Derrien and Womack 
(2003) in their study of three IPO pricing mechanisms in France (258 offerings). Nonetheless, we 
study two pricing methods and believe that our sample size is still sufficiently large to provide 
sound results. 
8 Means that are considerably higher than corresponding medians suggest a positively skewed 
distribution. For instance, mean market capitalization of the book-building IPO firm is ca. 5,072 
million NOK, while median firm has market capitalization of only 1,071 million NOK. This 
difference comes from the fact that the sample contains several “outlier” firms with extremely high 
market size.   
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million NOK. Also, there are different fractions of high-tech firms across book-
building and fixed-price IPOs. In the subsample of book-building IPOs, there are 
about 17% of high-tech firms, while in the fixed-price IPOs subsample there are 
only 13% of high-tech firms. Yet, these fractions are not significantly different 
from each other at any conventional significance level.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the sample of 166 Norwegian IPOs: 87 book-
building, 79 fixed-price IPOs from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2008 
Measure 
 
Book-
building 
Fixed-price 
Diff. test 
p-value 
All IPOs 
No. of issues   87 79 n/a 166 
Market capitalization 
(millions of NOK) 
Mean 5,071.9 553.6 0.025** 2,921.6 
Median 1,071.1 344.2 0.000*** 623.3 
% of high-tech firms   17.2% 12.7% 0.410 15.1% 
Book-to-market ratio 
  
Mean 0.45 0.99 0.000*** 0.70 
Median 0.41 0.50 0.214 0.45 
% of venture capital-
backed firms 
 29.9% 6.3% 0.000*** 18.7% 
Age of firm at IPO 
date (years) 
Mean 24 39 0.035** 31 
Median 8 15 0.032** 10 
% of firms offering 
secondary shares 
 60.9% 44.3% 0.032** 53.0% 
% of secondary 
shares of total 
offered   
Mean 51.3% 67.4% 0.024** 57.7% 
Median 50.0% 65.8% 0.384 51.6% 
Rank of issuing 
firm's underwriter  
Mean 5 9 0.000*** 7 
Median 4 8 0.000*** 5 
Gross proceeds 
(millions of NOK) 
Mean 1,108.0 187.8 0.012** 670.1 
Median 288.1 95.0 0.000*** 156.2 
First-day return 
(underpricing) 
Mean 3.36% 5.84% 0.278 4.54% 
Std Dev 12.15% 16.54% 0.026** 14.45% 
Median 1.41% 1.25% 1.000 1.28% 
Max 60.94% 53.85% n/a 60.94% 
Min -30.00% -34.21% n/a -34.21% 
Range 90.94% 88.06% n/a 95.15% 
% positive 51.72% 53.16% 0.853 52.41% 
Wealth lost by 
issuing firm (millions 
NOK) 
Mean 45.4 6.2 0.140 26.7 
Median 0.3 0.5 1.000 0.4 
Market return prior  
to IPO 
Mean 1.57% 0.48% 0.025** 1.05% 
Median 2.17% 0.91% 0.214 1.58% 
Mean volatility prior 
to IPO 
Mean 1.13% 0.96% 0.010*** 1.05% 
Median 1.00% 0.90% 0.030** 0.95% 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
  in the subsample of firms which sell a non-zero value of secondary shares in 
an IPO 
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We also observe from Table 2 that a typical book-building and fixed-price 
IPO firms have comparable and not significantly different book-to-market ratios 
(0.41 and 0.50 for book-building and fixed-price IPOs, respectively). There is, 
however, significantly higher fraction of venture capital-backed firms in the 
subsample of book-building IPOs (29.9%) than in fixed-price IPOs (6.3%). The 
age of a company at IPO date clearly indicates that fixed-price IPO firms are 
significantly older than book-building IPO companies. Age of a typical firm at 
IPO date using book-building as a pricing method is 8 years, while typical firm 
going public and using fixed-price method is 15 years old.  
In Table 2 we also note that around 44% of fixed-price IPO firms offer 
secondary shares (shares that are owned by insiders and sold in an IPO), whereas 
almost 61% of firms offer secondary shares in book-building IPOs. Further, if a 
firm does offer secondary shares, it on average offers around 67% of them as of 
total shares offered in fixed-priced IPOs, and ca. 51% in book-building IPOs 
(significantly different at 5% level). Underwriter‟s rank of a typical book-building 
IPO firm is 4 (1 being the highest rank), while the underwriter‟s rank is 
significantly lower for a median firm using fixed-price method – 8. Median book-
building IPO also has larger gross proceeds, or issue size, of around 288 million 
NOK than a typical fixed-price IPO with gross proceeds of only 95 million NOK. 
Table 2 also shows that the average underpricing in the whole sample is 
around 4.5%. Average first-day return of 3.36% for book-building IPOs is lower 
than the one for fixed-price IPOs of 5.84%9. The median book-building IPO 
underpricing of 1.41% is, however, higher than a median underpricing across 
fixed-price IPOs of 1.25%. Even though these numbers are different in the 
sample, we found no statistical reasons to believe that they are different in 
population (corresponding difference tests are insignificant at any convention 
levels of significance). Also, both book-building and fixed-price IPOs have a very 
similar range of the first-day return of around 88-91%, and the percentage of 
positive first-day returns of ca. 52-53%. In contrast, we found that fixed-price 
IPOs are associated with a significantly higher (at 5% significance level) standard 
                                                 
9 Average underpricing of Norwegian IPOs of 4.5%, as well as ca. 3.4% and 5.8% for book-
building and fixed-price mechanisms separately, are lower numbers than the ones, provided in 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), who find average levels of underpricing of 12% and 27%, 
for book-building and fixed-price IPOs, correspondingly. This may be due to the fact that our 
sample contains only book-building and fixed-price IPOs, that are on average less underpriced 
than other issues, a larger time-span of the sample, that includes periods of low overall market 
returns, or arguably lower underpricing in Norwegian IPO market in general 
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deviation of underpricing than book-building IPOs (16.54% versus 12.15%, for 
fixed-price and book-building IPOs, correspondingly). 
Average wealth lost by an issuing firm measures loss of funds in NOK 
terms due to underpricing by taking into account the issue size or gross proceeds 
of the IPO. Typical fixed-priced IPO firm “left money on the table” amounting to 
0.5 million NOK, while book-building IPO firm had lower median wealth loss of 
0.3 million NOK. Yet, these numbers are not significantly different. 
Lastly, as Table 2 suggest, book-building and fixed-price IPO firms go 
public in significantly different market conditions. Average book-building IPO is 
associated with the higher three-month-weighted market return prior to an IPO 
date of 1.57% and higher volatility of daily market return in a month prior to a 
listing date of 1.13%. Fixed-price IPOs have mean return and volatility equal to 
0.48% and 0.96%, correspondingly. 
In sum, a typical book-building IPO firm, when compared to a fixed-price 
IPO firm, has larger market capitalization at IPO date, higher probability of being 
venture capital-backed, is younger, has a higher probability of being the one that 
offers secondary shares in an IPO, has an underwriter with a higher rank, larger 
issue size/gross proceeds of an IPO, and goes public in conditions with a higher 
market return and volatility prior to a listing date. Additionally, the book-building 
mechanism is also associated with the lower standard deviation of underpricing. 
In contrast, typical book-building and fixed-priced IPO firms are indifferent with 
respect to the probability of being a high-tech firm, fraction of secondary shares as 
of total offered in an IPO (conditional on offering secondary shares at all), or the 
unconditional level of underpricing and “money left on the table” as a result of it. 
The important finding is, however, that even though unconditional 
underpricing of book-building and fixed-price IPOs is not statistically different, a 
lower mean and standard deviation of the first-day return of book-building IPOs 
are better distributional characteristics. This indicates that the book-building 
mechanism might be perceived to have a lower risk with respect to pricing than 
the fixed-price mechanism from issuing firm‟s perspective. 
5.3. Time trends in IPO activity and underpricing 
Table 3 illustrates the distribution of IPOs and average underpricing by 
year. For the reference purposes, general market conditions are provided in 
columns 2 and 3. Market return is calculated as an annual buy-and-hold log-return 
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on the OSEAX daily stock price index, while market volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of the daily log-return in the corresponding year. 
Firstly, high IPO activity, as measured by the number of IPOs, seems to 
occur in years with a high market return. For instance, in the period from 2003 to 
2007 when markets provided high returns, there were 78 IPOs, or ca. 47% of all 
IPOs in our sample. In contrast, in years with negative markets returns (i.e. 2001-
2002, and 2008) there were only 5, 2 and 6 IPOs, respectively. This is consistent 
with the time-clustering of IPOs in Ritter (1984), and the fact that firms prefer 
going public in “hot” markets (Derrien and Womack, 2003). On the contrary, it 
seems that volatility in overall market is a less important factor in triggering 
decisions of going public. A logical explanation, suggested by Derrien and 
Womack (2003), is that while the higher market return entails higher attainable 
valuations for perspective IPOs, higher volatility is associated with a more risky 
environment for going public. 
 
Table 3 Market conditions, number and initial return levels of Norwegian 
fixed-price and book-building IPOs from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 
2008 by year 
  
Market conditions All IPOs 
Book-building 
IPOs 
Fixed-price 
IPOs 
Year Return Volatility # 
Mean 
first-day 
return 
# 
Mean 
first-day 
return 
# 
Mean 
first-day 
return  
1993 50.7% 1.0% 7 1.6% 1 6.7% 6 0.8% 
1994 6.7% 0.8% 10 4.2% 0 n/a 10 4.2% 
1995 10.4% 0.7% 10 4.6% 2 11.6% 8 2.9% 
1996 23.5% 0.6% 6 21.9% 1 3.8% 5 25.6% 
1997 25.6% 1.0% 15 20.1% 1 31.5% 14 19.3% 
1998 -33.0% 1.6% 10 -2.0% 0 n/a 10 -2.0% 
1999 41.3% 1.0% 4 18.7% 1 13.9% 3 20.3% 
2000 0.9% 1.2% 11 4.3% 7 13.9% 4 -12.4% 
2001 -14.0% 1.2% 5 -6.0% 4 -7.1% 1 -1.3% 
2002 -29.1% 1.3% 2 -9.8% 1 -19.6% 1 0.0% 
2003 39.2% 0.9% 2 -2.3% 2 -2.3% 0 n/a 
2004 33.5% 0.9% 11 3.9% 9 3.8% 2 4.2% 
2005 41.7% 1.1% 23 2.6% 23 2.6% 0 n/a 
2006 28.5% 1.5% 17 3.6% 14 4.1% 3 1.4% 
2007 12.6% 1.2% 27 1.6% 19 1.1% 8 2.9% 
2008 -74.6% 2.9% 6 -5.8% 2 -1.5% 4 -8.1% 
Total 163.8% 1.3% 166 4.5% 87 3.4% 79 5.8% 
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Also, as expected, average first-day return levels are positively associated 
with market “hotness”. For example, in the period of 1996-1997, markets 
provided return of around 24-26% annually, and mean underpricing was around 
20-22% – the highest in the sample. Investors in Norwegian IPOs seem to require 
more underpricing when the market as a whole provides higher returns (consistent 
with Derrien and Womack, 2003). Lastly, even though both methods were used 
during the whole period concerned, the fixed-price mechanism dominated book-
building by the number of IPOs in 90s. From early 2000s, however, the number of 
book-building issues grows rapidly, and the fixed-price mechanism seems to lose 
its popularity. For instance, there were 60 fixed-price offerings from 1993 to 
2000, or 76% of all fixed-price IPOs in our sample. In the same time period, only 
13 firms used book-building as a pricing method. On the contrary, in the period of 
2001-2008, there were 74 book-building IPOs (or 85% of all book-building IPOs 
in the sample), and only 19 fixed-price IPOs. Hypothetically, this might be 
explained by a trend towards use of the more efficient book-building pricing 
mechanism in IPOs. We will further examine whether book-building is actually 
more efficient. 
5.4. Cross-sectional differences in the level and variability of underpricing 
In this subsection, we analyse the cross-sectional differences in the level 
and variability of underpricing by splitting the subsamples of Norwegian book-
building and fixed-price IPOs into different criteria-determined subgroups (listed 
in column 1 of Tables 4 and 5). 
Fixed-price IPOs 
Table 4 presents the cross-sectional differences in the subsample of fixed-
price IPOs. Column 3 provides values of mean first-day return, while column 4 – 
variance of first-day return. 
The average first-day return for fixed-price IPOs with above-median book-
to-market ratio of 2.24% is significantly lower (at 5% level) than 9.53% first-day 
return for IPO firms with below-median book-to-market ratio. This is in line with 
the finding of Brav and Gompers (2000) that companies with lower book-to-
market ratios are the ones with higher informational asymmetries, which results in 
higher underpricing levels. 
Further, fixed-price IPO firms that offer secondary shares have 
significantly higher (at 1% level) mean underpricing of 12.14% than firms which 
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do not sell secondary shares (0.82%). This finding is consistent with Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001). We infer that insider sales constitute a negative signal to 
investors in Norwegian fixed-price IPOs as well. 
 
Table 4 Cross-sectional differences in the level and variability of 
underpricing in the subsample of Norwegian fixed-price IPOs 
 
 
 N 
Mean first-
day return 
Variance of 
first-day return 
Market capitalization >= Median 40 4.25% 2.14% 
Market capitalization < Median 39 7.46% 3.28% 
p-value  0.394 0.316 
High-tech 10 20.66% 10.64% 
Non-high-tech 69 3.69% 1.55% 
p-value  0.117 0.011** 
Book-to-market >= Median 40 2.24% 2.28% 
Book-to-market < Median 39 9.53% 3.14% 
p=value  0.050** 0.453 
Venture capital-backed 5 -0.76% 1.71% 
Non-venture capital-backed 74 6.28% 2.77% 
p-value  0.291 0.414 
Age >= Median 41 7.74% 1.91% 
Age < Median 38 3.78% 3.56% 
p-value  0.297 0.158 
Offering secondary shares 35 12.14% 3.68% 
Not offering secondary shares 44 0.82% 1.93% 
p-value  0.003*** 0.152 
% of secondary shares >= Median 18 12.21% 3.06% 
% of secondary shares < Median 17 12.07% 4.32% 
p-value  0.982 0.571 
Underwriter rank >= Median 40 2.27% 2.63% 
Underwriter rank < Median 39 9.50% 2.78% 
p-value  0.052* 0.899 
Issue size >= Median 40 4.47% 2.12% 
Issue size < Median 39 7.24% 3.30% 
p-value  0.461 0.301 
Market return prior IPO  >= Median 40 11.10% 4.03% 
Market return prior IPO < Median 39 0.44% 1.34% 
p-value  0.004*** 0.017** 
Market volatility prior IPO >= Median 40 2.91% 2.26% 
Market volatility prior IPO < Median 39 8.84% 3.16% 
p-value  0.112 0.427 
 *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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Also, firms with an above-median underwriter rank have significantly 
lower initial return of 2.27% than those firms with the underwriter ranked below 
median (9.50%). We therefore conclude that Norwegian underwriters also provide 
a valuable ex-ante uncertainty signal, as Carter et al. (1998) find. We also note 
that higher-ranked underwriters may be better at pricing IPO shares, for instance, 
due to their superior experience or better skills.  
Lastly, when a 3-month-weighted market return prior to an IPO is above 
median in the sample, fixed-price IPOs exhibit a significantly higher level of 
underpricing of 11.10%, compared to the firms that went public in conditions with 
a below-median market return prior to a listing date (mean first-day return of 
0.44%). This finding is consistent with Derrien and Womack (2003), who argue 
that the previous market return has a large and positive impact on the level of the 
first-day return. 
In contrast, no statistically significant cross-sectional differences in the 
first-day return were found between subgroups of fixed-price IPO firms with 
above and below median market capitalization, age, percentage of secondary 
shares offered, and the issue size. Likewise, the first-day return is not statistically 
different between high-tech and non-high-tech, venture capital-backed and non-
venture capital-backed firms. In addition, splitting by the second measure of 
market conditions prior to an IPO – market volatility of daily return in a month 
prior to an IPO – does not provide evidence of different underpricing. 
By examining the last column of Table 4, we find that high-tech firms 
have a significantly higher variance of underpricing of 10.64% while non-high-
tech have the variance of only 1.55% (as a matter of fact, even though not 
statistically different, high-tech firms also have dramatically higher mean level of 
underpricing of approximately 21% than non-high-tech companies with mean 
first-day return of ca. 4%). This finding may be attributed to the fact that high-
tech firms are much harder to price due to high levels of informational 
asymmetries, which in turn increases the “imprecision” of pricing (particularly 
using fixed-price method). Then, the variance of the first-day return is 
significantly higher in IPOs that occurred in conditions with above-median market 
return (4.03%), while below-median market-return IPOs have the variance of only 
1.34% (consistent with finding of Derrien and Womack (2003) that market 
conditions not only have an impact on the level of underpricing, but as well on its 
variability). In contrast, no evidence has been found that the variance of 
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underpricing differs significantly when one splits the sample of fixed-price IPOs 
across other variables. 
Having analysed the subsample of fixed-price IPOs, we conclude this 
section with the overview of cross-sectional differences in the level and variability 
of the first-day return in book-building IPOs, which is presented in Table 5. 
Book-building IPOs 
Table 5 Cross-sectional differences in the level and variability of 
underpricing in the subsample of Norwegian book-building IPOs 
 
 
 N 
Mean first-
day return 
Mean Squared 
Deviation of 
first-day return 
Market capitalization >= Median 44 6.56% 1.65% 
Market capitalization < Median 43 0.08% 1.30% 
p-value  0.012** 0.686 
High-tech 15 0.99% 1.14% 
Non-high-tech 72 3.85% 1.54% 
p-value  0.372 0.542 
Book-to-market >= Median 44 1.55% 1.31% 
Book-to-market < Median 43 5.21% 1.64% 
p-value  0.164 0.707 
Venture capital-backed 26 4.06% 2.08% 
Non-venture capital-backed 61 3.06% 1.22% 
p-value  0.757 0.517 
Age >= Median 45 4.14% 1.33% 
Age < Median 42 2.52% 1.63% 
p-value  0.542 0.740 
Offering secondary shares 53 3.35% 1.51% 
Not offering secondary shares 34 3.38% 1.42% 
p-value  0.991 0.926 
% of secondary shares >= Median 27 4.35% 1.36% 
% of secondary shares < Median 26 2.31% 1.67% 
p-value  0.556 0.683 
Underwriter rank >= Median 57 3.24% 0.91% 
Underwriter rank < Median 30 3.59% 2.54% 
p-value  0.914 0.184 
Issue size >= Median 44 5.71% 2.04% 
Issue size < Median 43 0.95% 0.90% 
p-value  0.068* 0.192 
Market return prior IPO  >= Median 44 5.43% 2.17% 
Market return prior IPO < Median 43 1.24% 0.76% 
p-value  0.109 0.108 
Market volatility prior IPO >= Median 44 2.74% 1.60% 
Market volatility prior IPO < Median 43 4.00% 1.34% 
p-value  0.633 0.769 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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The main findings from Table 5 are that, firstly, first-day return of 6.56% 
is statistically higher in book-building IPOs with above-median market 
capitalization, than in IPOs with below-median market size of 0.08%. Further, 
offerings with above-median issue size also have statistically higher underpricing 
of 5.71%, while mean underpricing in below-median issue size offerings is only 
0.95%. These findings are contradicting the studies of Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
and Ibbotson et al. (1994) who claim that a higher issue size entails lower ex-ante 
uncertainty, and subsequently lower underpricing. Additionally, as was noted 
before, companies with higher market capitalization gain higher analyst coverage 
during their IPOs, which should also decrease informational asymmetries, and 
consequently underpricing. 
However, we take notice that these are unconditional differences. We 
believe that investigation of the impact of issue size on underpricing is more 
sensible when one controls for the market size first. Therefore, we expect the 
regression analysis in the next section to shed more light on these unexpected 
findings. 
To conclude, no other cross-sectional differences in the level of first-day 
return are statistically significant. Likewise, no significant differences in the 
variance of first-day return in book-building IPOs have been found at this point. 
In sum, with the exception of market size and issue size in book-building IPOs, 
our findings in the cross-sectional analysis are consistent with previous studies.  
We now proceed with a more formal empirical analysis in the next section. 
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6. Empirical evidence 
In this section, the results of regression analyses will be presented and 
related to previous studies. We firstly investigate and compare the relationships 
between firm, issue characteristics, market conditions and underpricing in book-
building and fixed-price IPOs. We will then use a pricing mechanism dummy 
variable approach in regressions to robustly compare the level and variability of 
underpricing across book-building and fixed-price mechanisms after controlling 
for the known effects of the above-mentioned variables. Next, the differential 
impact of market conditions on the level and variability of underpricing is 
analysed and endogeneity of the pricing mechanism choice is implemented. We 
conclude this section with the investigation of the pricing mechanism choice 
determinants, and analysis of underpricing in different market “hotness” 
conditions.  
6.1. Analysis and comparison of factors explaining first-day return levels in 
book-building and fixed-price IPOs 
In this subsection, individual company‟s first-day return levels are 
regressed upon a set of firm, issue, and market conditions variables, suggested by 
previous studies and outlined in section 4. Table 6 presents the results of 
regression models with First-day return as a dependent variable, on the 
subsamples of book-building and fixed-price IPOs separately. 
As Table 6 suggest, rather different set of factors is significantly related to 
first-day returns in book-building and fixed-price IPOs. Other things equal, firms 
with larger market capitalization have significantly higher (at 1% level) 
underpricing in book-building IPOs. In contrast, market capitalization is not 
significantly related to underpricing in fixed-price IPOs. Seemingly, Norwegian 
book-building IPO firms with larger market capitalization are either not perceived 
to be less ex-ante uncertain, or there are other stronger forces that outweigh the 
decreased underpricing due to lower informational asymmetries common in large 
market size companies. One of the plausible explanations of positive relation 
between the market size and level of underpricing in book-building IPOs may be 
the fact that such firms attract a higher number of potential investors. In turn, 
investors, who have not been allocated shares during the course of book-building, 
actively trade in the aftermarket to satisfy their demand through acquiring shares. 
Subsequently, this may drive the prices up, and lead to higher first-day return 
IPO Pricing Mechanisms in Norway – GRA 19003 Master Thesis  30.08.2013 
Page 34 
levels. Even though we cannot claim that this is an exhaustive reason behind a 
positive relationship between a market size and underpricing, we accept it as a 
reasonable explanation of this finding. 
 
Table 6 Determinants of the first-day return level in Norwegian book-
building and fixed-price IPOs from January, 1993 to December, 2008 
Subsample Book-building IPOs Fixed-price IPOs 
Dependent variable First-day return First-day return 
Intercept -0.663 0.122 
 (-2.390)** (0.398) 
Ln (Market capitalization) 0.053 0.015 
 (3.353)*** (0.911) 
High-tech dummy -0.028 0.148 
 (-0.929) (2.026)** 
Ln (Book-to-market ratio) 0.018 -0.026 
 (2.055)** (-2.446)** 
Venture capital-backed dummy 0.018 -0.123 
 (0.508) (-1.493) 
Age of firm 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.262) (3.090)*** 
“No insider sales” dummy  -0.003 -0.066 
 (-0.096) (-2.229)** 
Ln (Underwriter market share)  -0.158 -0.331 
 (-1.247) (-1.785)* 
Ln (Issue size) -0.022 -0.019 
 (-1.741)* (-1.429) 
Market return (3-month-
weighted monthly return) 
1.416 0.913 
(2.248)** (1.656) 
Market volatility (monthly 
volatility of daily return) 
3.300 -3.601 
(0.851) (-0.914) 
N 87 79 
Adjusted R Squared 0.113 0.355 
F-value 2.094 5.293 
p-value 0.035 0.000 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
As Table 6 also suggests, while the high-tech dummy is insignificant in 
book-building regression, high-tech firms have significantly higher underpricing 
in fixed-price IPOs (dummy variable coefficient is significant at 5% level). 
Moreover, the economic significance is also extremely large: if a given firm is 
high-tech, it has on average 14.8% higher underpricing, ceteris paribus. We 
therefore infer that the book-building mechanism more efficiently deals with high 
IPO Pricing Mechanisms in Norway – GRA 19003 Master Thesis  30.08.2013 
Page 35 
informational asymmetries, common in high-tech companies, by implementing 
them into the final offer price, than the fixed-price mechanism does. 
Book-to-market ratio turns out to be a significant factor to explain the 
first-day return in both book-building and fixed-price IPOs, though the direction 
of its impact is different. Firms with higher book-to-market value tend to have on 
average lower underpricing if the fixed-price method is used to price IPO shares 
(consistent with the point of Brav and Gomper (2000) that the higher book-to-
market value of equity is a proxy for the lower informational asymmetry). On the 
contrary, the higher book-to-market ratio is associated with higher underpricing if 
the book-building method is employed, other things equal.  
The presence of venture capitalist does not significantly influence the level 
of underpricing in either book-building or fixed-price IPOs. Then, while age of a 
firm at IPO date does not have any significant impact on underpricing in book-
building IPOs, older companies are more underpriced in fixed-price IPOs. 
However, in economic terms, the effect of the firm‟s age is rather small: a 100 
years increase in age increases underpricing by only 1%.  
“No insider sales” dummy variable is insignificant in the book-building 
regression, while it enters significantly the fixed-price regression. The economic 
significance is rather large: those firms that do not offer secondary shares in the 
fixed-price IPO, have on average 6.6% lower first-day return, ceteris paribus. This 
finding provides evidence that insider sales do provide an unfavourable signal to 
investors (as Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue) in Norwegian fixed-price IPOs 
as well. By the same token, an underwriter‟s reputation, as measured by his 
respective market share, does not significantly affect underpricing levels in book-
building IPOs, whereas higher-ranked underwriters seem to be able to decrease 
the first-day return in fixed-price IPOs, which is consistent with argumentation of 
Carter et al. (1998) that higher-ranked underwriters should underwrite higher-
quality issues with eventually lower underpricing levels. 
As Table 6 also indicates, issue size is not significantly related to 
underpricing in fixed-price IPOs, while it is significantly negatively associated 
with underpricing in book-building IPOs. We therefore find evidence that, for a 
given market size of the company, higher size issues are perceived to have lower 
ex-ante uncertainty from the perspective of investors in Norwegian book-building 
IPOs. This finding is in line with Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Ibbotson et al. 
(1994).  
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Lastly, market return prior to an IPO has a significant impact on 
underpricing in book-building IPOs. In economic terms, 1% increase in 3-month-
weighted market return prior to an IPO increases the first-day return level on 
average by ca. 1.42%. In fixed-price IPOs, 1% increase in market return translates 
into 0.91% increase in underpricing (though only marginally significant at around 
10% level). At this point, the book-building pricing mechanism appears to be 
more sensitive to previous market conditions than the fixed-price method. The 
second moment of market conditions – market volatility – does not have any 
significant impact on underpricing in either fixed-price or book-building IPOs 
subsamples. Yet, we will draw more robust conclusions about the differential 
impact of market conditions after carefully testing it at later stages of the analysis.  
6.2. Analysis and comparison of factors explaining the unconditional 
variance of first-day return in book-building and fixed-price IPOs 
Table 7 presents the results of regression models with Squared deviation 
of first-day return as a dependent variable, and a set of firm, issue characteristics 
and market conditions as explanatory variables, on the subsamples of book-
building and fixed-price IPOs separately. Squared deviation of first-day return is a 
measure of unconditional variability of underpricing (without controlling for the 
likely effects of firm, issue characteristics and market conditions on underpricing). 
As one may infer from Table 7, the explanatory power of book-building 
regression is rather small. As indicated by the insignificant F-test and near-zero 
Adjusted R-squared, independent variables do not jointly significantly explain the 
unconditional variability of underpricing in book-building IPOs. Nevertheless, 
two variables enter significantly the regression model. Book-building IPOs with a 
higher book-to-market ratio have on average a higher variability of first-day 
return. On the contrary, firms with higher-ranked underwriter exhibit a lower 
variability of underpricing, other things equal. This finding suggests that higher-
ranked underwriters appear to be better skilled at pricing shares in book-building 
IPOs with higher precision. 
The explanatory power of fixed-price regression (F-test significant at 1% 
level, and Adjusted R-squared equal to ca. 34%) is quite high (in contrast to book-
building regression). This fact itself manifests that the unconditional variance of 
underpricing in fixed-price IPOs is more sensitive to our set of independent 
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variables. Thus, we assert that the fixed-price mechanism is less efficient in terms 
of pricing accuracy than the book-building mechanism. 
 
Table 7 Determinants of the unconditional variability of first-day return in 
Norwegian book-building and fixed-price IPOs from January, 1993 to 
December, 2008 
Subsample Book-building IPOs Fixed-price IPOs 
Dependent variable 
Squared deviation 
of first-day return 
Squared deviation 
of first-day return 
Intercept -0.092 0.048 
 (-0.718) (0.619) 
Ln (Market capitalization) 0.005 0.001 
 (0.960) (0.251) 
High-tech dummy -0.006 0.092 
 (-0.626) (3.157)*** 
Ln (Book-to-market ratio) 0.005 0.001 
 (1.802)* (0.429) 
Venture capital-backed dummy 0.009 -0.037 
 (0.574) (-1.856)* 
Age of firm 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.278) (0.385) 
“No insider sales” dummy 0.002 -0.006 
 (0.127) (-0.686) 
Ln (Underwriter market share) -0.094 0.045 
 (-1.831)* (1.212) 
Ln (Issue size) 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.367) (-0.705) 
Market return (3-month-
weighted monthly return) 
0.003 0.172 
(0.014) (1.027) 
Market volatility (monthly 
volatility of daily return) 
-0.431 0.143 
(-0.392) (0.122) 
N 87 79 
Adjusted R Square -0.028 0.344 
F-value 0.770 5.088 
p-value 0.657 0.000 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
As can be seen from Table 7, fixed-price regression‟s explanatory power is 
fully driven by two variables. Firstly, high-tech firms have a significantly higher 
unconditional variance of first-day return, which provides evidence if favour of 
little ability of the fixed-price mechanism to price shares of companies with high 
levels of informational asymmetries accurately. In contrast, venture capital-
backed firms have a significantly lower unconditional variability of first-day 
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return. As expected, venture capitalists help to overcome informational 
asymmetries when the fixed-price method is used to price IPO shares, which 
translates into a lower variance of first-day return, or higher pricing precision of 
venture-capital backed fixed-price IPOs.   
6.3. Analysis and comparison of factors explaining the conditional variance of 
first-day return in book-building and fixed-price IPOs 
 
Table 8 Determinants of the conditional variability of first-day return in 
Norwegian book-building and fixed-price IPOs from January, 1993 to 
December, 2008 
Subsample Book-building IPOs Fixed-price IPOs 
Dependent variable 
Squared residuals 
of first-day return 
Squared residuals 
of first-day return 
Intercept -0.062 -0.021 
 (-0.706) (-0.449) 
Ln (Market capitalization) 0.003 0.000 
 (0.936) (-0.143) 
High-tech dummy -0.006 0.032 
 (-0.863) (1.943)* 
Ln (Book-to-market ratio) 0.004 0.001 
 (2.180)** (0.823) 
Venture capital-backed dummy 0.009 0.006 
 (0.774) (0.349) 
Age of firm 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.280) (0.820) 
“No insider sales” dummy 0.005 0.005 
 (0.504) (0.764) 
Ln (Underwriter market share) -0.061 0.069 
 (-1.751)* (1.261) 
Ln (Issue size) 0.001 0.001 
 (0.330) (0.460) 
Market return 0.007 0.155 
 (0.067) (1.304) 
Market volatility -0.377 0.197 
 
(-0.596) (0.326) 
N 87 79 
Adjusted R Square -0.014 0.095 
F-value 0.885 1.815 
p-value 0.551 0.074 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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Table 8 presents the result of regression models with Squared residuals of 
first-day return as a dependent variable, and a set of firm, issue characteristics, 
and market conditions as explanatory variables, on the subsamples of book-
building and fixed-price IPOs separately. 
Squared residuals of first-day return is a measure of conditional variability 
of underpricing, after controlling for effects of firm, issue characteristics and pre-
offering market conditions on underpricing. For each observation, it is constructed 
as a squared difference between actual observed level of first-day return, and the 
first-day return level predicted using the coefficients of regression in Table 5 
(with First-day return as a dependent variable). 
 The main finding from Table 7 is that our result for variability of 
underpricing of book-building IPOs still holds. Variability of underpricing is still 
positively associated with the book-to-market ratio, and negatively with the 
underwriter rank. From the fixed-price regression we infer, however, that 
variability of underpricing, after controlling for other explanatory variables, is no 
longer significantly related to the presence of venture capitalist. Nevertheless, 
high-tech firms still exhibit a higher variability of underpricing in fixed-price 
IPOs. 
6.4. Analysis of differences in the level and variability of first-day return in 
book-building and fixed-price IPOs using a dummy variable approach 
In Table 2 we found that average underpricing of book-building IPOs is 
3.36%, while average underpricing associated with fixed-price IPOs is 5.84%. 
However, after having performed the Two-tail t-test, we found that this difference 
is not statistically significant. In the same table we also found that book-building 
IPOs are associated with a significantly lower variability of underpricing 
(standard deviation of 12.15%) than fixed-price IPOs (standard deviation of 
16.54%). However, these are unconditional mean level and variability of first-day 
return, i.e. without controlling for firm, issue and market conditions effects. In this 
subsection, we use the dummy variable approach as a more robust procedure to 
test the differences in the level and variability of underpricing after controlling for 
firm, issue and market conditions variables.  
Table 9 presents the results of regression models with First-day return, 
Unconditional variance of first-day return and Conditional variance of first-day 
return as dependent variables, a set of firm, issue, and market conditions as 
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independent control variables, and a pricing mechanism dummy variable (encoded 
as 1 for book-building, and 0 for fixed-price), on the whole sample of 166 IPOs. 
 
Table 9 Pricing mechanism dummy variable regressions on the whole sample 
of 166 Norwegian IPOs from January, 1993 to December, 2008 
Dependent variable 
First-day 
return 
Unconditional 
variance of 
first-day return 
Conditional 
variance of 
first-day return 
Intercept -0.176 -0.001 -0.019 
(-0.967) (-0.015) (-0.258) 
Ln (Market capitalization) 0.026 0.002 0.000 
(2.365)** (0.426) (0.052) 
High-tech dummy 0.051 0.035 0.020 
(1.291) (2.352)** (1.903)* 
Ln (Book-to-market ratio) -0.010 0.000 0.000 
(-1.172) (0.103) (0.092) 
Venture capital-backed 
dummy 
-0.020 -0.008 0.006 
(-0.597) (-0.534) (0.451) 
Age of firm 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(3.225)*** (-0.654) (-0.314) 
“No insider sales” dummy -0.056 -0.007 0.002 
(-2.435)** (-0.741) (0.297) 
Ln (Underwriter market 
share) 
-0.262 -0.005 -0.014 
(-2.363)** (-0.137) (-0.425) 
Ln (Issue size) -0.015 0.000 0.002 
(-1.703)* (-0.071) (0.774) 
Market return 1.304 0.198 0.132 
(3.071)*** (1.471) (1.331) 
Market volatility 0.299 0.117 -0.057 
(0.115) (0.139) (-0.101) 
Pricing mechanism 
dummy (1:book-building)  
-0.052 -0.018 -0.009 
(-1.953)* (-2.143)** (-1.280) 
N 166 166 166 
Adjusted R Square 0.178 0.056 -0.003 
F-value 4.248 1.898 0.953 
p-value 0.000 0.043 0.491 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
Our main finding from Table 9 is that pricing mechanism dummy variable 
enters significantly regressions with First-day return and Unconditional variance 
of first-day return as dependent variables (at 10% and 5% levels of significance, 
respectively).  
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Economically, this implies that after controlling for firm and issue 
characteristics and market conditions prior to an IPO, book-building IPOs on 
average are associated with 5.2% lower underpricing than fixed-price IPOs, 
ceteris paribus. Likewise, book-building IPOs on average are associated with 
1.8% lower unconditional variance of first-day return, when compared to 
fixed-price IPOs. Although not statistically significant, pricing mechanism 
dummy variable in the last-column regression also has a sign that is in accordance 
with our expectations: it implies that book-building IPOs on average have 0.9% 
lower conditional variance of underpricing in our sample. Yet, statistically, we 
cannot claim whether conditional variances of first-day return of book-building 
and fixed-price IPOs differ in population. 
All in all, after using robust dummy variable approach regressions, and 
controlling for firm, issue and market conditions variables, we conclude that 
book-building mechanism is more efficient than the fixed-price method, as it 
underprices significantly less and has higher accuracy of pricing (partial evidence 
supported by the significantly lower unconditional variance of first-day return). 
Keeping all variables constant, if a firm moves from using book-building 
mechanism to the fixed-price method, it will suffer a decline in IPO gross 
proceeds, while potential investors in an IPO will gain. Another implication is that 
investors in fixed-price IPOs on average realize significantly higher returns than 
investors in book-building IPOs. 
Lastly, Table 9 also indicates that increase in 3-month-weighted market 
return prior to an IPO of 1% is associated with approximately 1.3% significant 
increase in the average level of underpricing. Therefore, in the next subsection we 
will study whether there is a differential impact of market conditions in book-
building and fixed-price IPOs. 
6.5. Differential impact of market conditions on the level and variability of 
first-day return in book-building and fixed-price IPOs 
Table 10 presents the results of regression models with First-day return, 
Unconditional variance of first-day return and Conditional variance of first-day 
return as dependent variables, and firm, issue characteristics, and pricing 
mechanism dummy variable (encoded as 1 for book-building, and 0 for fixed-
price) as control variables, and Market return and Market Volatility, split by 
procedure, as explanatory variables of interest, on the whole sample of IPOs. 
IPO Pricing Mechanisms in Norway – GRA 19003 Master Thesis  30.08.2013 
Page 42 
After splitting market conditions variables by procedure, we firstly infer 
from Table 10 that Market Volatility*Book-building and Market Volatility*Fixed-
price does not have any significant impact on the level or variability of 
underpricing. 
 
Table 10 Differential impact of market conditions on the level and variability 
of underpricing in the sample of Norwegian IPOs from January, 1993 to 
December, 2008 (market conditions variables split by procedure) 
Dependent variable 
First-day 
return 
Squared 
deviation of 
first-day return 
Squared 
residuals of 
first-day return 
Intercept -0.123 0.003 -0.026 
(-0.655) (0.042) (-0.364) 
Ln (Market capitalization) 0.027 0.001 0.000 
(2.435)** (0.359) (-0.074) 
High-tech dummy 0.050 0.034 0.018 
(1.264) (2.296)** (1.748)* 
Ln (Book-to-market ratio) -0.009 0.000 0.000 
(-1.081) (0.145) (-0.006) 
Venture capital-backed 
dummy 
-0.026 -0.006 0.008 
(-0.776) (-0.442) (0.557) 
Age of firm 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(3.106)*** (-0.703) (-0.321) 
“No insider sales” dummy -0.052 -0.007 0.002 
(-2.264)** (-0.733) (0.266) 
Ln (Underwriter market 
share) 
-0.261 -0.003 -0.014 
(-2.309)** (-0.085) (-0.393) 
Ln (Issue size) -0.017 0.000 0.002 
(-1.892)* (-0.060) (1.017) 
Pricing mechanism dummy 
(1:book-building)  
-0.137 -0.013 0.005 
(-2.002)** (-0.604) (0.370) 
Market return*Book-
building 
1.604 0.089 0.004 
(2.682)*** (0.452) (0.030) 
Market return*Fixed-
price 
1.170 0.282 0.200 
(1.959)* (1.599) (1.562) 
Market volatility*Book-
building 
4.134 -0.164 -0.667 
(1.107) (-0.142) (-0.886) 
Market volatility*Fixed-
price 
-3.839 0.072 0.495 
(-0.970) (0.058) (0.613) 
N 166 166 166 
Adjusted R Square 0.177 0.047 -0.018 
F-value 3.729 1.633 0.777 
p-value 0.000 0.082 0.684 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
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We therefore conclude that, even after testing the differential impact of 
market volatility on the joint sample of book-building and fixed-price IPOs, and 
controlling for firm, issue characteristics and pricing mechanism-specific 
differences, the level and variability of underpricing is still unaffected by the 
volatility in the general market prior to a listing date in either book-building or 
fixed-price IPOs. This finding is consistent with our previous results from 
regressions on fixed-price and book-building IPOs subsamples separately in 
Tables 5, 7, and 8. 
The most important finding from column 2 of Table 10 is that Market 
return*Book-building and Market return*Fixed-price variables are significant at 
1% and 10% levels, respectively. Economically, this implies that the book-
building pricing mechanism is more sensitive to market return prior to an IPO 
than the fixed-price method. 1% increase in 3-month weighted market return prior 
to an IPO is associated with ca. 1.6% increase of underpricing if book-building 
was used in IPO, and 1.1% increase in case of the fixed-price mechanism, other 
things equal. As market return has a larger impact on underpricing in book-
building IPOs, the fixed-price mechanism seems to be more efficient in terms of 
controlling for the recent market return impact on first-day return. However, we 
also take into account the fact that failure to implement endogeneity of the pricing 
mechanism choice into regression analysis can potentially bias the obtained 
results, as Jenkinson, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001) argue. Therefore, next 
subsection is devoted to this potential endogeneity problem.  
6.6. Implementing the endogeneity of the pricing mechanism choice 
In this subsection, the endogeneity of the pricing mechanism choice is 
implemented into regressions in Table 10. We use a two-stage least-squares 
procedure. On the first stage, we use variables that are exogenous with respect to 
underpricing as predictors in a multinomial logistic model with a pricing 
mechanism dummy as a dependent variable. We then use logistic regression 
model coefficients to predict the probability of choosing book-building (versus 
fixed-price) for every IPO in the sample. Next, we substitute our pricing 
mechanism dummy variable with these predicted probabilities and run the same 
regressions as in Table 10 (with an exception of independent variables that we use 
as instruments in logistic regression). 
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Most of the variables we have used so far are endogenous with respect to 
underpricing. Only three variables are exogenous, i.e. they are insignificant 
predictors of level of first-day return (please see column 2 in Table 10). These 
variables are High-tech dummy, Ln (Book-to-market ratio), and Venture capital-
backed dummy. For the sake of completeness, we construct two more variables 
that might possibly influence the choice of the procedure. First one is Percentage 
of shares created, constructed as a ratio of shares created in an IPO to existing 
shares before IPO10. We also add Ln (Total assets) as predictor variable in the first 
stage logistic regression, which is a proxy for economic size of a firm. In 
unreported regressions, first-day return was regressed upon these two new 
variables to make sure they are not significant predictors, and can be used as 
instruments in the first-stage logistic regression11. 
Table below presents the results of the first-stage logistic regression. 
Table 10 First-stage logistic regression 
Dependent variable 
Pricing mechanism 
dummy (1:book-building) 
Intercept 
-5.325 
(-2.303)** 
High-tech dummy 
-0.191 
(-0.364) 
Ln (Book-to-market 
ratio) 
-0.451 
(-1.907)* 
Venture capital-
backed dummy 
1.948 
(3.475)*** 
Ln (Total Assets) 
0.252 
(2.349)** 
Percentage of 
shares created 
-0.343 
(-1.758)* 
N 166 
McFadden 
Pseudo-R Squared 
0.177 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
 
As Table 10 indicates, the higher the book-to-market ratio and percentage 
of shares created, the lower is the probability of choosing book-building (versus 
                                                 
10 We winsorized this variable at 5%-95% tails since it contained several observations with 
extremely high percentages of shares created. 
11 Both single regression models showed that neither variable has significant impact (at any 
conventional significance level) on underpricing. Thus, we can assume them to be exogenous with 
respect to underpricing.  
IPO Pricing Mechanisms in Norway – GRA 19003 Master Thesis  30.08.2013 
Page 45 
fixed-price) as a pricing method. On the contrary, in the presence of a venture 
capitalist, the probability of choosing the book-building mechanism is higher. 
This indicates that venture capitalists in Norway prefer book-building IPOs to 
fixed-price IPOs as an exit vehicle. 
Also, companies with a larger economic size, as measured by total assets, 
have a higher probability of choosing book-building. Derrien and Womack (2003) 
suggest that larger firms typically are the ones that want to attract foreign 
investors, who in turn may be unwilling to participate in fixed-price IPO since it 
gives them no advantages in terms of shares allocation. In effect, larger companies 
tend to select book-building as a pricing procedure. 
Although four out of five variables used are significant predictors of the 
pricing mechanisms choice, the overall model predictive ability is rather small as 
indicated by the McFadden pseudo R-squared of 0.177. 
Table 11 presents the results of the second-stage regressions. Our main 
finding from it is that, after controlling for endogeneity of the pricing mechanism 
choice, the book-building pricing mechanism turns out to be able to efficiently 
incorporate market conditions in the pre-offering period into the final offer price, 
as indicated by the insignificant coefficients of Market return*Book-building and 
Market volatility*Book-building variables in the First-day return regression. 
Likewise, neither Unconditional variance of first-day return, nor Conditional 
variance of first-day return variable is significantly sensitive to previous market 
conditions in book-building IPOs.  
In contrast, the fixed-price mechanism is less efficient in terms of 
controlling for previous market conditions, as Market return*Fixed-price IPO has 
a significant impact on both the level of first-day return and the variability of first-
day return (both conditional and unconditional). In economic terms, 1% increase 
in the 3-month-weighted market return in the pre-offering period increases 
underpricing associated with fixed-price IPOs by around 1.5%. Likewise, 1% 
increase in market return increases unconditional variance of underpricing by 
0.36% and conditional variance by 0.28%, respectively. Therefore, the fixed-price 
mechanism has little ability to incorporate market conditions in the period prior to 
an IPO into the final offer price. This inefficiency translates into higher 
underpricing and lower accuracy of pricing.  
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Table 11 Second-stage regressions 
Dependent variable 
First-day 
return 
Squared 
deviation of 
first-day return 
Squared 
residuals of 
first-day return 
Intercept -0.105 0.024 0.010 
(-0.596) (0.372) (0.179) 
Ln (Market capitalization) 0.033 0.003 0.000 
(2.896)*** (0.699) (-0.023) 
Age of firm 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(2.803)*** (-1.117) (-0.914) 
“No insider sales” dummy -0.065 -0.010 -0.001 
(-2.339)** (-0.881) (-0.133) 
Ln (Underwriter market 
share) 
-0.259 0.004 -0.017 
(-2.364)** (0.116) (-0.495) 
Ln (Issue size) -0.024 -0.002 0.001 
(-2.216)** (-0.454) (0.143) 
Predicted probability of 
choosing book-building  
-0.034 -0.013 0.003 
(-0.535) (-0.554) (0.110) 
Market return*Book-
building 
0.785 -0.005 0.021 
(1.621) (-0.042) (0.180) 
Market return*Fixed-price 1.503 0.358 0.279 
(2.444)** (1.906)* (1.854)* 
Market volatility*Book-
building 
-2.260 -0.919 -0.350 
(-0.901) (-1.320) (-0.581) 
Market volatility*Fixed-
price 
-0.138 0.043 0.235 
(-0.040) (0.039) (0.272) 
N 166 166 166 
Adjusted R Square 0.159 0.002 -0.028 
F-value 
p-value 
4.127 1.039 0.544 
0.000 0.413 0.857 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are given in parentheses 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
Even though not statistically significant, the negative sign and magnitude 
of the coefficient of Predicted probability of choosing book-building variable 
(column 2 in Table 11) is in accordance with our expectations: it is negative, and 
equal to -3.4%. Thus, after implementing the endogeneity of the pricing 
mechanism choice, book-building IPOs still exhibit lower First-day return in our 
sample. We believe that its insignificance may be explained by the small 
explanatory power of the variables used in the first-stage logistic regression.  
We would also like to refer here to the paper of Ljungqvist et al. (2003), 
who carefully explored the endogeneity of the pricing mechanism choice issue. In 
section 3.2 of their paper they say “… OLS estimates for the coefficients of 
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endogenous choice dummies are likely to be inconsistent and serious bias will 
lead to understatement of the effects on underpricing of book building, choice of 
U.S. bank, and marketing to U.S. investors”. Thus, the endogeneity bias actually 
leads to understatement of the effect of the endogenous choice dummy variable. 
Therefore, if there is any bias in our regressions, we would expect the 
underpricing of fixed-price IPOs (as well as unconditional variability of 
underpricing) to be actually even higher, than reported in Table 9. 
6.7. Determinants of the pricing mechanism choice 
On the first stage of the two-stage least squares regression in the previous 
subsection, we have already found four significant determinants of the pricing 
mechanism choice. In this subsection, we run an extra logistic regression model 
(presented in Table 12) aimed at testing whether other independent variables from 
Table 9 potentially influence the choice of the procedure. 
 
Table 12 Determinants of the pricing mechanism choice in 
Norwegian IPOs 
Dependent variable 
Pricing mechanism 
dummy (1:book-building) 
Intercept 
 
-22.425 
(-5.237)*** 
Ln (Market 
capitalization) 
1.063 
(4.174)*** 
Age of firm 
 
-0.009 
(-1.671)* 
“No insider sales” 
dummy 
-0.583 
(-1.541) 
Ln (Underwriter 
market share) 
3.118 
(1.725)* 
Ln (Issue size) 0.063 
(0.348) 
N 166 
McFadden 
Pseudo-R Squared 
0.244 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively 
 
As can be seen from Table 12, the larger the expected market size, the 
higher the probability of choosing book-building. The explanation is the same as 
for economic size variable in Table 10: larger companies are usually willing to 
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attract foreign investors, who dislike fixed-price IPOs due to the inability to have 
advantages with respect to shares allocation in them.  
Table 12 also indicates that older companies have a higher probability of 
choosing the fixed-price method. Lastly, the higher the underwriter rank, the 
higher is the probability of choosing book-building. We believe that this is due to 
the fact that highest-ranked underwriters in our sample are specialized in this 
procedure.  
6.8. Analysis of underpricing during “cold” and “hot” markets 
We conclude the empirical part of the research with the brief analysis of 
first-day return differences in various market conditions. Table 13 presents the 
breakdown of IPOs in our sample by market “hotness” quintiles, with quintile 5 
being the “hottest”. The number of IPOs in each quintile and first-day return 
levels, also split by the pricing mechanism, are presented below. 
 
Table 13 Distribution of Norwegian book-building and fixed-price IPOs by 
market hotness quintiles 
Market 
“hotness” 
quintile 
Measure 
Book-
building 
IPOs 
Difference 
in first-
day-return 
Fixed-
price 
IPOs 
All 
IPOs 
1 No. of IPOs 12 
 
19 31 
 
Mean first-day return -3.40% 3.29% -0.10% -1.38% 
   
(0.462) 
  2 No. of IPOs 21 
 
20 41 
 
Mean first-day return 3.36% -2.41% 0.95% 2.18% 
   
(0.288) 
  3 No. of IPOs 16 
 
17 33 
 
Mean first-day return 3.28% -0.30% 2.98% 3.12% 
   
(0.950) 
  4 No. of IPOs 24 
 
16 40 
 
Mean first-day return 4.20% 18.08% 22.28% 11.43% 
   
(0.003)*** 
  5 No. of IPOs 14 
 
7 21 
 
Mean first-day return 7.81% -2.52% 5.29% 6.97% 
   (0.748)   
*** indicates significance at 1% level 
 
As can be noted from Table 13, in the “coldest” quintile, average 
underpricing is negative for both book-building and fixed-price IPOs (-3.40% and 
-0.10%, respectively). When one moves from bearish quintiles to more bullish 
quintiles, there is evidence of a roughly monotonic increase in average 
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underpricing levels (with an exception of underpricing in quintile 5 for fixed-price 
IPOs). 
The key finding from Table 13 is however that the differences in 
underpricing between fixed-price and book-building IPOs are not statistically 
significant in relatively “cold” quintiles 1, 2, 3. But in the fourth “hotness” 
quintile, fixed-price mechanism has underpricing of around 22%, while average 
underpricing for book-building is only 4%. The difference in first-day return 
levels of 18% is highly statistically significant at 1% level. Thus, as markets get 
hotter, the fixed-price mechanism tends to underprice even more than book-
building. This finding further supports our previous regression results that the 
fixed-price mechanism is less efficient than book-building in terms of ability to 
properly incorporate market “hotness” into the final offer price, as has been found 
in Table 11.  
Having presented the empirical analysis, we draw conclusions in the last 
section. 
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7. Conclusion 
In our research, we have analysed and compared the efficiency of initial 
public offering pricing mechanisms. The efficient pricing mechanism has been 
defined as the one that is associated with a lower level of underpricing, lower 
variability of underpricing (i.e., higher accuracy of pricing), and the one that more 
completely incorporates recent market conditions in the pre-offering period into 
the final offer price (i.e., which underpricing level and variability are less sensitive 
to market conditions in the pre-offering period). The question is particularly 
interesting in the Norwegian IPO market, where firms going public mainly choose 
among two alternatives – book-building and the fixed-price method, and thus, 
their efficiency can be robustly compared. Thus, in our master thesis paper we 
have made an attempt to bring so far inexistent empirical evidence from Norway 
on which pricing mechanism (book-building versus fixed-price) is more efficient, 
i.e. underprices less, has higher accuracy of pricing, and is less sensitive to market 
conditions prior to an IPO. 
We have analysed 166 Norwegian equity offerings, initially listed on Oslo 
Stock Exchange, during the period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2008, 
priced by book-building and the fixed-price mechanism. After using a robust set 
of models, and controlling for differences in firm, issue and market conditions 
prior to an IPO, we have found that, on average, the book-building mechanism is 
associated with significant 5.2% lower underpricing, than the fixed-price 
mechanism. Further, some partial evidence has been found that book-building has 
also lower variability of underpricing (significant 1.8% lower unconditional 
variance of underpricing). Yet, 0.9% lower conditional variance of underpricing 
in our sample is not statistically significant in population. Therefore, we accept 
the fact that we cannot claim that variability of underpricing between book-
building and fixed-price mechanisms is different12 
Our analysis also suggests that book-building pricing mechanism 
effectively incorporates market conditions in the pre-offering period into the final 
offer price. Neither the level of underpricing, nor the variability of underpricing is 
significantly sensitive to either market return or volatility in the period prior to an 
IPO. On the contrary, the fixed-price mechanism is less effective with respect to 
                                                 
12 We believe that the inability to reject the null of no difference between conditional variability of 
underpricing in book-building and fixed-price IPOs is mainly due to the limitation imposed by a 
relatively small sample size. It is highly likely that an increase in number of observations  could 
provide enough statistical power to reject this null hypothesis.  
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controlling for previous market conditions, as market return in the pre-offering 
period has a significant positive impact on both the level and variability of 
underpricing (1% increase in 3-month-weighted market return in the pre-offering 
period translates into 1.5% increase in the level of underpricing, and 0.36% and 
0.28% increases in unconditional and conditional variability of underpricing, 
respectively). 
It has also been found that the choice of the pricing mechanism in 
Norwegian IPOs is contingent on several firm and issue characteristics. For 
instance, firms with the higher book-to-market value of equity, larger number of 
shares to be created in an IPO, and older firms (all the three variables are proxies 
for lower ex-ante uncertainty) are more likely to choose the fixed-price method. 
On the contrary, firms with venture capital investment are more likely to choose 
book-building (presumably because Norwegian venture capitalists prefer book-
building IPOs to fixed-price IPOs as an exit vehicle). Larger size companies (both 
in economic and market terms) are also more likely to choose book-building 
(apparently in attempt to attract foreign investors who are reluctant to fixed-price 
IPOs in which they get no preferences with respect to shares allocation). Also, 
firms with higher-ranked underwriters are more likely to use book-building as a 
pricing mechanism (apparently because highly ranked underwriters in Norway are 
specialized in this procedure). 
All things considered, we conclude that book-building is a more efficient 
pricing mechanism in Norwegian IPO market, as it underprices less and is less 
sensitive to the market conditions prior to an IPO, than the fixed-price method. 
The key implications of our findings for the issuer are as follows. Keeping 
everything else constant, if a given firm moves from using book-building in its 
IPO to the fixed-price mechanism, it will suffer a decline in IPO gross proceeds. 
Furthermore, the decline in gross proceeds will be even more substantial (and 
more variable) in “hot” markets. Therefore, after controlling for all the other 
possible objectives of an IPO, different from pricing issues, book-building is a 
more rational pricing mechanism choice. The implication for potential investors is 
that investors in fixed-price IPOs on average realize higher returns than investors 
in book-building IPOs. The “hotter” the market is, the larger (and more variable) 
the difference between realized returns is.  
As a matter of fact, it has been also found that the fixed-price mechanism 
dominated book-building by the number of IPOs in 90s, however, from early 
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2000s and forward, the number of book-building issues grows, while the fixed-
price method seems to lose its previous popularity. In light of our findings, this 
may arguably represent a time trend towards use of a more efficient book-building 
pricing mechanism in Norwegian IPOs. 
 As a concluding remark, while the rationale behind using book-building as 
a pricing mechanism is fairly understandable (more efficient pricing, better set of 
owners etc.), it is less clear what features of the fixed-price method make it still 
attractive for firms going public in the Norwegian IPO market. We believe that 
lower direct costs of issuance might be a possible explanation. Therefore, formal 
implementation of direct costs into the models might be a fruitful area for further 
research. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1. List of IPOs in the sample and pricing mechanisms used 
Listing 
date 
Company name Pricing 
mechanism 
19930705 Smedvig Tankships Ltd. Fixed price 
19931112 First Olsen Tankers Fixed price 
19931117 Nordic American Shipping Fixed price 
19931210 Western Bulk Shipping Fixed price 
19931213 Kongsberg Gruppen (Senere Norsk Forsvarsteknologi) Fixed price 
19931217 Bona Shipholding Fixed price 
19931220 Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse Book-building 
19940110 Braathens SAFE Fixed price 
19940113 Rica Hotell- og Restaurantkjede Fixed price 
19940502 Sparebanken Rogaland (Gr.f.bevis) Fixed price 
19940502 Sparebanken Midt-Norge (Gr.f.bevis) Fixed price 
19940502 Gresvig Fixed price 
19940502 Sparebanken Nord-Norge (Gr.f.bevis) Fixed price 
19940705 Steen & StrÃ¸m Fixed price 
19940715 JÃ¸tul Fixed price 
19940729 EEG-Henriksen Gruppen Fixed price 
19940919 Atlantic Container Line Fixed price 
19950104 Sparebanken Vest (Gr.f.bevis) Fixed price 
19950406 Kongsberg Automotive Fixed price 
19950406 Ekornes Fixed price 
19950621 Fesil (Ila and Lilleby Smelteverker AS) Fixed price 
19950731 Legra Fixed price 
19951016 Fokus Bank Book-building 
19951025 Santech Micro Group Book-building 
19951026 Selmer Fixed price 
19951027 Sandnes Sparebank Fixed price 
19951218 Toten sparebank (Gr.f.bevis) Fixed price 
19960503 NetCom Book-building 
19960604 Narvesen Fixed price 
19960613 Ringerike Sparebank Fixed price 
19960617 PC-Systemer Norge Fixed price 
19960807 Medi-Cult Fixed price 
19961101 P4 Radio Hele Norge Fixed price 
19970120 Indre Sogn Sparebank Fixed price 
19970317 ContextVision Fixed price 
19970317 Seateam Technology Fixed price 
19970421 Kitron Fixed price 
19970502 Choice Hotels Scandinavia Fixed price 
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19970604 Procon Offshore Fixed price 
19970627 EDB - Elektronisk Databehandling Fixed price 
19971001 Iterated Systems Fixed price 
19971009 Ulstein Holding Fixed price 
19971015 Fred. Olsen Energy Book-building 
19971027 Solstad Offshore Fixed price 
19971119 Aktiv Kapital (Aktiv Inkasso) Fixed price 
19971121 Int. Gold Exploration IGE Fixed price 
19971215 Norcool Holding Fixed price 
19971218 Fredrik Lindegaard Fixed price 
19980114 Team Shipping Fixed price 
19980226 Tecmar Technologies Int. (TTI Holding) Fixed price 
19980515 Luxo Fixed price 
19980602 Stavdal Maskinutleie Fixed price 
19980603 Havila Supply Fixed price 
19980618 Norema Fixed price 
19980706 SynnÃ¸ve Finden Fixed price 
19980708 Eltek Fixed price 
19980812 Aurskog Sparebank Fixed price 
19981019 Nes Prestegjelds Sparebank Fixed price 
19990701 Industrifinans Forvaltning Fixed price 
19990713 Infostream Fixed price 
19990713 Enitel Book-building 
19990817 HÃ¸land Sparebank Fixed price 
20000203 Helgeland Sparebank Fixed price 
20000314 Stepstone Book-building 
20000414 Expert Eilag Book-building 
20000505 Nutri Pharma Book-building 
20000519 Flora - Bremanger Sparebank Fixed price 
20000529 PhotoCure Book-building 
20000607 Scandinavia Online AB Book-building 
20000619 Customax Fixed price 
20000619 Webcenter Solutions Fixed price 
20000718 Sait Sento Book-building 
20001204 Telenor Book-building 
20010613 Consorte Group Book-building 
20010618 Statoil Book-building 
20010629 Domstein Book-building 
20010716 Acta Holding Book-building 
20010717 Odim Hitec Fixed price 
20020403 Q-Free Book-building 
20020603 LerÃ¸y Seafood Group Fixed price 
20031218 Norwegian Air Shuttle Book-building 
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20031219 NextGenTel Holding Book-building 
20040311 Opera Book-building 
20040325 Yara International Book-building 
20040329 Catch Communications Book-building 
20040402 Aker KvÃ¦rner Book-building 
20040510 Mamut ASA Book-building 
20040525 Findexa Limited Book-building 
20040528 Medi-Stim Fixed price 
20040624 Conseptor Book-building 
20040628 Camillo Eitzen & Co Book-building 
20041112 Active 24 Book-building 
20041217 BjÃ¸rge Fixed price 
20050223 Petrojack ASA Book-building 
20050309 Exploration Resources (Polar seismikk) Book-building 
20050317 Wilson ASA Book-building 
20050318 APL ASA Book-building 
20050426 Polimoon Book-building 
20050503 Oslo Areal ASA Book-building 
20050513 Aker Seafood Book-building 
20050607 Norway Energy & Marine Insurance Book-building 
20050609 Via Travel Group Book-building 
20050624 Kongsberg Automotive Holding Book-building 
20050627 Revus Energy Book-building 
20050708 Artumas Group Inc. Book-building 
20050923 Media & Research Group Book-building 
20051013 Bluewater Insurance Book-building 
20051024 Cermaq Book-building 
20051024 Powel Book-building 
20051025 Bergesen Worldwide Gas Book-building 
20051104 Biotec Pharmacon Book-building 
20051116 Norgani Hotels Book-building 
20051118 Odim Book-building 
20051212 Grenland Group Book-building 
20051213 Funcom Book-building 
20051214 NorDiag Book-building 
20060208 Petrobank Energy and Resources Ltd Book-building 
20060317 Block Watne Gruppen ASA Book-building 
20060411 SeaBird Exploration Ltd Book-building 
20060509 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA Book-building 
20060630 Petrojarl Book-building 
20060703 Ability Group Book-building 
20060705 Trolltech Book-building 
20060707 Clavis Pharma Fixed price 
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20061019 Codfarmers Book-building 
20061023 Northland Resources Fixed price 
20061102 Eitzen Chemical Book-building 
20061110 AKVA Group Book-building 
20061110 Pertra Book-building 
20061115 Norwegian Property Book-building 
20061208 Faktor Eiendom Book-building 
20061212 Spits Book-building 
20061221 Crew Minerals Fixed price 
20070323 NEAS ASA Book-building 
20070327 Algeta ASA Book-building 
20070330 ElectroMagnetic GeoServices ASA Book-building 
20070330 Nexus Floating Production Ltd Book-building 
20070503 Klepp Sparebank Fixed price 
20070508 SalMar ASA Fixed price 
20070510 ScanArc ASA Book-building 
20070511 Fred.Olsen Production ASA Book-building 
20070515 Bouvet ASA Book-building 
20070525 Protector Insurance ASA Book-building 
20070530 Arrow Seismic ASA Book-building 
20070606 InvivoSense ASA Fixed price 
20070611 RomReal Ltd. Book-building 
20070612 Badger Explorer ASA Book-building 
20071003 EOC Limited Book-building 
20071008 SeaJacks International Limited Fixed price 
20071009 London Mining Book-building 
20071011 ETMA International ASA Fixed price 
20071011 Pronova Biopharma ASA Book-building 
20071015 Abillity Drilling Book-building 
20071029 NÃ¸tterÃ¸ Sparebank Fixed price 
20071030 Eastern Echo Holding Plc Book-building 
20071122 Scandinavian Clinical Nutrition Fixed price 
20071205 Hafslund Infratek ASA Book-building 
20071217 Aker Exploration ASA Fixed price 
20071217 Aker Philadelphia Shipyard Book-building 
20071221 IGE Nordic AB Book-building 
20080110 Aqua Bio Technology ASA Fixed price 
20080130 NattoPharma ASA Book-building 
20080618 PCI Biotech Holding Fixed price 
20080624 Norway Pelagic Fixed price 
20080627 Remedial Offshore PCL Book-building 
20080630 Bergen Group  Fixed price 
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9.2. List of underwriters, their market shares and ranking 
Underwriter Market Share Rank 
DnB 0.40422 1 
Carnegie 0.12347 2 
Sundal Collier 0.11381 3 
Enskilda 0.09289 4 
Pareto 0.04691 5 
Goldman Sachs 0.04448 6 
Fondsfinans 0.03498 7 
Fearnley 0.03114 8 
Alfred Berg 0.03078 9 
Morgan Stanley 0.01611 10 
Orkla 0.01468 11 
First  0.00857 12 
Natwest 0.00742 13 
SG. Warburg 0.00660 14 
Terra 0.00406 15 
Deutsche Bank 0.00358 16 
CS First Boston 0.00328 17 
Christiania 0.00267 18 
CAR 0.00233 19 
KBC 0.00219 20 
Handelsbanken 0.00196 21 
Elcon 0.00189 22 
Orion 0.00123 23 
Finanshuset 0.00045 24 
SPN Fonds 0.00027 25 
Karl Johan 0.00004 26 
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9.3. Correlations matrix 
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Introduction 
The phenomenon of initial public offering underpricing has been 
extensively studied in academic literature. Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) 
present a first comprehensive research on IPOs in an international perspective. 
They document that underpricing is present in roughly all IPOs globally, priced 
by means of different mechanisms.  
Loughran et al. (1994) argue that underpricing constitutes a cost to the 
issuer, and is not optimal since proceeds are “left on the table”. On the contrary, 
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) claim that some positive amount of underpricing 
may, in fact, benefit the issuer. Nonetheless, there seem to be no clear 
recommendation of what level of underpricing is optimal, academic IPO literature 
clearly suggests that excessive underpricing is detrimental to the issuer, who is 
predominantly concerned with maximization of its IPO proceeds. Yet again, 
Loughran et al. (1994) were first to draw attention to the fact that one should 
consider a pricing mechanism used in the IPO when evaluating its success, 
measured by gross proceeds that are exposed to underpricing.    
The most noticeable research has been done in the strand of IPO literature 
that explains differences in IPO initial returns as a result of informational 
asymmetries that presumably exist amongst various parties involved in the IPO 
process. The way these informational asymmetries are handled by IPO pricing 
mechanisms, as we will see, is crucial. 
 As a general rule, parties involved in the IPO process include a firm going 
public (the issuer), a bank underwriting the issue (the underwriter) and investors. 
As there is obviously no secondary market so far for IPO shares, the issuer 
together with the underwriter need to determine the price of stocks to be issued. 
Three pricing mechanisms may be employed with the purpose of price 
determination. These mechanisms are bookbuilding, fixed-price method, and 
auctions. 
IPO pricing methods differ considerably with respect to whether the price 
discovery occurs before or after the final offer price is set (Busaba and Chang, 
2010). For example, in the bookbuilding process, which predominates in the 
United States and recently has spread to other parts of the world, noticeably 
Europe, the underwriter interacts with investors during the “road show”, where 
investors bid their non-binding indications of interest. This process allows the 
underwriter to learn the demand for the issue, and subsequently set the appropriate 
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offer price. In contrast, the “true” price evolves only after an offer is made if the 
fixed-price method is used. Naturally, therefore, a dissimilar structure of various 
pricing mechanisms results in their different treatment of informational 
asymmetries present in IPOs. In turn, this affects the underpricing associated with 
the issue. 
Growing theoretical literature on the topic gave rise to empirical tests of 
the superiority of one mechanism over another. The question is particularly 
interesting in countries, where more than one mechanism is available to price IPO 
shares, and thus they can be compared. Selected empirical evidence advocates for 
the superiority of auctions over bookbuilding (Derrien and Womack (2003) for 
France; Kaneko and Pettway (2003) for Japan). Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and 
Wilhelm (2003) find that European bookbuilt IPOs are more underpriced than 
fixed-price offerings, which contradicts most of the influential theoretical studies 
(Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Spatt and Srivastava (1991), Biais and Faugeron-
Crouzet (2002) and other). In a nutshell, both theoretical and empirical findings 
are so far inconclusive. 
To our knowledge, the question is rather unexplored in the Norwegian IPO 
market, which provides the firms going public with two alternatives of the IPO 
pricing mechanisms – bookbuilding and the fixed-price method. In our research, 
we will compare their efficiency as measured by both the level of underpricing 
and variance of underpricing. If we find that one method is associated with lesser 
underpricing, we will then try to answer the puzzling question why not all the 
firms choose this superior method. For this reason, in our research we will also 
test empirically what are the significant determinants of the pricing mechanism 
choice in Norwegian firms going public. To sum up, in our master thesis we are 
eager to bring so far inexistent empirical evidence on the question from Norway. 
We will start with the review of the most relevant theoretical literature and 
selected empirical papers. Then, based on the key findings, we will formulate 
testable hypotheses and possible extensions. Next, the methodology used to 
investigate the issue will be outlined. Lastly, we will specify the data needed. 
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Literature Review 
Rock (1986) presents one of the pioneering studies in the informational 
asymmetries and IPO underpricing literature. In his paper, Rock develops a model 
of a fixed-price method of IPO pricing, where he assumes the existence of a group 
of investors with pricing-relevant information, and the issuer is assumed to be 
unable to acquire this information before the offer price is set. There are no 
incentives for informed investors to reveal their information before the offer price 
is set and they can avoid participation in the overvalued IPOs. Conversely, 
uninformed investors cannot avoid participation in such IPOs, and as a result 
experience a winner‟s curse. He argues that underpricing is compensation to 
uninformed investors for experiencing the winner‟s curse, as informed investors 
crowd them out of the high quality offerings. He concludes that in order to 
guarantee that uninformed investors participate in the IPO, issued shares should 
be priced at a discount. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) study the bookbuilding pricing mechanism. 
Clearly, in contrast to Rock (1986), the underwriter is now assumed to be able to 
obtain information from informed investors before the offer price is set. In their 
model, underpricing is compensation to investors for the disclosure of positive 
information about the issue. Thus, the underwriter‟s role is to mitigate the 
informational asymmetry by using her discretion over pricing and allocation that 
motivates investors to reveal their information about the issue. Investors reveal 
their information to the underwriter by bidding their non-binding indications of 
interest. Among other, they conclude that the new issue will be associated with 
less underpricing and respectively more proceeds to the issuer, compared to a 
fixed-price offer. 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) essentially extend the model of 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) by analysing the consequences of constraining the 
underwriters in their efforts to extract information from informed investors. 
Underwriters maximize IPO proceeds by using a combination of price and 
allocation discrimination, given the opportunity to allocate shares among both 
regular (mostly informed institutional investors) and retail investors (mostly 
uniformed investors). Constraining underwriters in their efforts decreases the 
expected proceeds from the IPO by limiting the underwriter‟s ability to weaken 
the winner‟s curse. They argue that uniform-price restrictions increase the costs of 
gathering information from regular investors, and if they are combined with 
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allocation restrictions, the underwriter appears to be no longer able to reduce the 
informational asymmetry because information gathering is impossible. At one 
extreme, when both uniform price and allocation restrictions are in place, the 
issuer may experience the consequences of the full winner‟s curse facing 
uninformed investors as in Rock (1986) and thus, bookbuilding loses its 
advantages relative to the fixed-price mechanism. If not, they argue, bookbuilding 
is an efficient pricing method and dominates the fixed-price mechanism.  
Spatt and Srivastava‟s (1991) results are consistent with previous papers. 
They argue that the regular fixed-price procedure is inefficient since it does not 
utilize any information about investors‟ valuations. They further consider an 
augmented fixed-price mechanism by allowing informal communication between 
the underwriter and investors prior to the allocation of the issue. This 
communication, which resembles the bookbuilding model in Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), can transmit relevant information between the parties. They 
conclude that the fixed-priced mechanism with a non-binding premarket 
communication, that provides an underwriter with indications of interest, leads to 
the allocation and pricing that maximizes issuers expected proceeds, given the 
informational constraints. Thus, they actually support the notion of the efficient 
bookbuilding mechanism.  
Welch (1992) focuses on the fixed-price mechanism and informational 
cascades. Under assumption that all investors possess equally valuable and 
correlated information, can observe each other‟s subscription decisions and their 
subscriptions are not simultaneously pro-rated, but instead served sequentially, he 
provides an explanation of IPO underpricing without a winner‟s curse (contrary to 
Rock, 1986). He argues that when an IPO is sold sequentially, later investors can 
learn from purchasing decisions of earlier investors, which can lead to 
informational cascades in which investors optimally ignore their private 
information and rely on and imitate the actions of earlier investors. Thus, in the 
fixed-price mechanism underpricing is used to avoid information gathering and is 
needed in order to create a positive informational cascade. On the other hand, in 
the bookbuilding procedure information about the demand is undisclosed by the 
underwriter to other investors. Therefore, informational cascades cannot develop, 
and less underpricing is required, ceteris paribus. 
Hanley (1993) provides evidence that the bookbuilding procedure may be 
exposed to the partial adjustment phenomenon. She claims that issues associated 
IPO Pricing Mechanisms in Norway – GRA 19003 Master Thesis  30.08.2013 
Page 67 
with the partial adjustment phenomenon – those that have positive offer price 
revisions – exhibit both an increase in underpricing and the number of offered 
shares. This result is consistent with Benveniste and Spindt (1989) who claim that 
the final offer price is only partially adjusted to the information gathered through 
bookbuilding. She argues that issues with the final offer price exceeding the limits 
of the price range have greater underpricing, ceteris paribus. Moreover, issuers 
and underwriters tend to price in the initially set price range. For that reason, the 
final offer price may not be sufficiently increased to capture the excess demand, 
which results in excess underpricing. 
Benveniste and Busaba (1997) theoretically compare fixed-price and 
bookbuilding mechanisms under assumption that investors possess correlated 
information and can observe each other‟s subscription decisions. They model 
fixed-priced mechanism similarly to Welch (1992). As a result, in their setting 
bookbuilding no longer stochastically dominates the fixed-priced mechanism as in 
Spatt and Srivastava (1991). They argue that underpricing required under the 
fixed-price procedure in order to create a positive informational cascade is larger 
than underpricing needed to induce investors to reveal information in 
bookbuilding. Therefore, bookbuilding generates higher expected proceeds than 
the fixed-price method. However, it is as well associated with greater uncertainty. 
They conclude that it is the degree of price risk endogenous to the issue and risk-
aversion of the issuer that are the determinants of the issuer‟s choice of the pricing 
mechanism. They argue that the certainty of the proceeds is an advantage of the 
fixed-priced method, and for that reason, it may be attractive for more risk-averse 
issuers.  Thus, they conclude that both the fixed-price and bookbuilding may be 
optimal from the issuer‟s point of view, contingent on her characteristics. 
Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) develop a unified theoretical model in 
order to analyse and compare different pricing mechanisms. They provide 
evidence that the fixed-price mechanism leads to inefficient pricing of IPO shares 
and a winner‟s curse (consistent with Rock, 1986), whereas auction mechanism 
can lead to inefficiencies due to implicit collusion among investors. Lastly, 
bookbuilding leads to the optimal information revelation from investors about 
their valuation of stocks and an efficient price discovery (consistent with 
Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). Thus, both auction and bookbuilding methods are 
superior to the fixed-price mechanism. And unless there are inefficiencies caused 
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by collusion among investors, auction and bookbuilding procedures are equally 
efficient. 
Sherman and Titman (2002) further study the bookbuilding mechanism of 
pricing IPO shares. They develop a model, in which an underwriter selects a 
group of targeted investors, pricing and allocation mechanisms that maximize the 
information generated during the IPO process subject to a minimum cost. In 
contrast to previously discussed papers (most notably Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989), they argue that underpricing in bookbuilding is needed so as to induce 
investors to produce information, rather than reveal it. Therefore, investors 
experience a cost of acquiring information, which should be compensated by 
corresponding underpricing. They conclude that when there is no need in accurate 
pricing, the expected gain from underpricing exactly offsets the costs of acquiring 
information by investors. However, when pricing accuracy is of high importance, 
the number of participating investors, as well as amount of underpricing increases, 
and on average underpricing will go above the information acquisition costs 
encountered by investors. Thus, the firms with a high need for pricing accuracy 
(e.g. riskier firms, smaller size firms with potentially less liquid shares, firms with 
significant future capital needs) are likely to be more underpriced. 
Ljungqvist, Jenksinson and Wilhelm (2003) perform a cost-benefit 
analysis of the global integration of IPO markets and a followed-on adoption of 
the US-style bookbuilding mechanism throughout 65 countries in 1990s, where 
the fixed-price method dominated until then. They find that on average, both 
pricing mechanisms are associated with the similar level of underpricing – around 
20%. They argue that bookbuilding on its own does not lead to lower 
underpricing. However, bookbuilding leads to significantly lower underpricing 
relative to the fixed-price method, or bookbuilding by domestic underwriters if 
only it is conducted by US underwriters or targeted at US investors. Even though 
it is twice as much expensive as the fixed price mechanism, gains associated with 
it – decreased underpricing – outweigh additional direct costs of hiring a US 
underwriter or targeting at a US investor. They explain this due to longer 
bookbuilding experience of US banks that seem to be better at rewarding investors 
for revealing information dynamically. What is more, they find that European 
bookbuilt IPOs are more underpriced than fixed-price offerings. However, these 
results may be due to the fact that the issuer chooses the pricing mechanism 
endogenously, depending on her characteristics. Sectors with high degrees of 
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informational asymmetry (e.g., IT and biotech) may benefit from either 
production (as in Sherman and Titman, 2002) or revelation (as in Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989) in the course of bookbuilding. 
In their paper, Derrien and Womack (2003) investigate empirically IPO 
pricing mechanisms and underpricing based on the French IPO market, where all 
the three pricing mechanisms, namely auctions, bookbuilding and fixed-price 
offers are used. They focus their research not exclusively on the amount of 
underpricing, but also on the variability of underpricing that is related to previous 
market conditions, as they show. They argue that cross-sectional variance of 
underpricing is another important aspect of the efficiency of pricing mechanisms. 
They find that amongst all the mechanisms, the auction method is associated with 
lesser amount and variance of underpricing, thus it is superior to both 
bookbuilding and fixed-price mechanisms. They argue that its auctions 
mechanism‟s ability to incorporate information on current and previous market 
conditions into the final offer price that is the reason for its superiority. 
Bookbuilding appears to be the second-best alternative that may be opted for 
because of other objectives different from reduced underpricing, for example, a 
better-selected set of owners. 
Kaneko and Pettway (2003) present a study of IPOs in Japan, which 
moved from an auction-priced to underwriter-priced IPOs using bookbuilding 
mechanism in 1997. In line with Derrien and Womack (2003), they find evidence 
that initial returns of the bookbuilt IPOs are significantly higher than those of the 
auctions, especially in hot market conditions. They relate higher underpricing of 
the bookbuilt IPOs to the setting of the upper price limit by the underwriter too 
low at the stage of registering preliminary prospectus, and typical setting of the 
final offer price no higher than the upper bound of the price range by underwriters 
of the Japanese IPOs, despite the fact that the demand function learned through 
bookbuilding suggests a higher appropriate price. 
Most of the previously reviewed studies assume that the “true” value of 
offered shares is established instantly after trading begins (e.g., Benveniste and 
Wilhelm, 1990; Spatt and Srivastava, 1991; Benveniste and Busaba, 1997; Biais 
and Faugeron-Crouzet, 2002). On the contrary, Busaba and Chang (2010) analyse 
bookbuilding and fixed-price mechanisms allowing for strategic aftermarket 
trading by informed investors. They find that both methods require more 
underpricing when informed investors consider aftermarket trading. This is 
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particularly true for the bookbuilding procedure, which becomes especially costly 
since investors‟ bidding behaviour is adversely affected by the potential for profits 
in aftermarket. Underpricing is thus required to offset the losses of uniformed 
investors who face trading with informed investors in aftermarket. They argue that 
dominance of the bookbuilding procedure may be established if only the 
discretion to limit participation in the premarket is added to discretion to condition 
allocations (discussed in Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990). Thus, in contrast to 
previous studies, that at large document the superiority of the bookbuilding 
method, they argue that the fixed-price mechanism produces on average higher 
expected proceeds, unless the underwriter can target its bookbuilding activity to a 
small subset of informed investors. Thus, they found an efficiency rationale of the 
common practice in bookbuilt US IPOs to limit the bookbuilding activity to a 
group of institutional informed investors. 
 
Hypotheses 
 The traditional standpoint of IPO pricing mechanisms efficiency virtually 
supports the notion of the efficient bookbuilding pricing mechanism. It origins 
from the most notable theoretical works of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), 
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava (1991), and it is supported 
by later studies of Benveniste and Busaba (1997), Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet 
(2002). For the most part, they all agree that bookbuilding efficiently dominates 
the fixed-price method as it is associated with less underpricing, and respectively 
more proceeds to the issuer. Our central hypothesis is thus inspired by their works 
and is formulated in the following manner: 
On average, those IPOs that are priced using the bookbuilding mechanism 
are associated with less underpricing, compared to fixed-priced offerings. 
In contrast to a conventional viewpoint, Busaba and Chang (2010) argue 
that on average, the fixed-price mechanism produces higher expected proceeds, 
unless the underwriter can target its bookbuilding activity to a small subset of 
informed investors. Also, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) find 
empirically that European bookbuilt IPOs are more underpriced than fixed-priced 
offerings (Norwegian IPOs are not included in their sample). Therefore, we 
formulate the competing hypothesis as follows: 
On average, those IPOs that are priced using the fixed-price mechanism 
are associated with less underpricing, compared to bookbuilt offerings.     
IPO Pricing Mechanisms in Norway – GRA 19003 Master Thesis  30.08.2013 
Page 71 
In their paper, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) also find that on 
average in their sample (including European IPOs; Norway is not included), both 
bookbuilding and fixed-price mechanisms are associated with the similar level of 
underpricing – around 20%. Thus, we also consider the possibility that there may 
be no significant relation between the pricing mechanism used in an IPO and its 
consequent underpricing in the Norwegian IPO market. This is our null 
hypothesis. 
There are several extensions of the research question we are eager to test. 
 Derrien and Womack (2003) argue that there is another important feature 
of the pricing mechanism efficiency in addition to low underpricing. They suggest 
that underwriters are also typically concerned about controlling the aftermarket 
price variation, particularly the downside potential. Therefore, they claim, low 
cross-sectional variance of underpricing is another important aspect of the pricing 
mechanism efficiency. This matter was as well addressed by Busaba and Chang 
(1997), who suggest that the bookbuilding mechanism is associated with greater 
aftermarket uncertainty. Therefore, in our master thesis we will also assess this 
aspect of the pricing efficiency of bookbuilding versus the fixed-price mechanism.    
Finally, there are theoretical and empirical studies that clearly suggest 
superiority of one pricing mechanism over another with respect to underpricing. 
For instance, Derrien and Womack (2003) and Kaneko and Pettway (2003) 
provide empirical evidence that the auction pricing mechanism is associated with 
less underpricing than bookbuilding. Probably, the most puzzling question is then 
why not all firms going public opt for the same superior pricing mechanism that 
maximizes the IPO proceeds. With respect to this matter, Benveniste and Busaba 
(1997) were first to point out that both bookbuilding and fixed-price mechanisms 
may be optimal from an issuer‟s perspective, conditional on her characteristics. 
Later, Ljungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) also argue that the issuer selects 
the pricing mechanism endogenously, and this choice is contingent on her 
characteristics. Lastly, Derrien and Womack (2003) emphasise that the issuer‟s 
choice of a pricing mechanism may as well be driven by other determinants, 
different from lesser underpricing (for example, preference for controlling the 
aftermarket price variability discussed above). Therefore, in our research we will 
also investigate what are the significant determinants of the choice of a pricing 
mechanism in Norwegian firms going public, if any. 
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Methodology 
The central objective of the current research is to test empirically the 
efficiency of bookbuilding versus the fixed-price mechanism, measured by the 
amount and variance of underpricing. We will follow the conventional definition 
of underpricing, or initial return, calculated as the difference between the closing 
price on the first day of trading and the offer price. The variance of underpricing 
will be proxied by either cross-sectional squared deviations of the initial return 
around the means in the subsamples of bookbuilt and fixed-priced IPOs, or 
obtained as squared residuals from the initial multivariate regression model with 
the initial return as dependent variable, as showed below. In most parts, our 
methodology will be consistent with Derrien and Womack (2003) and Kaneko and 
Pettway (2003). 
In order to grasp the initial idea of the pricing mechanisms‟ efficiency, we 
will examine the statistical moments of distributions across different dimensions 
and then compare the average levels and variances of underpricing associated with 
bookbuilt and fixed-priced IPOs by performing t-tests of differences in means. We 
will then proceed with controlling for the likely effects of the characteristics of the 
firm (industry, age, book-to-market ratio), the issue (size, fraction of shares 
issued, goal of the IPO, rank of the underwriter), and previous market conditions 
(market return and volatility) on the initial return.  
We will construct the market return variables for several periods, such as 
1-week, 1-month, and 3-month prior the IPO date, for every IPO in a sample. 
Stock market index, such as the OBX, will be used to calculate the market return 
as a buy-and-hold return over a corresponding period. We will then normalize 
these returns to obtain average monthly returns over each period. In the same 
manner, we will compute market volatility variables as the standard deviation of 
daily returns of the OBX index over corresponding periods. 
We will use a set of industry dummy variables, and alternatively, dummy 
variables like high-tech versus non-high-tech firm, depending on the sample. Age 
(in years) and the book-to-market value of equity of a firm will be measured at the 
IPO date. We will measure the size of the issue by the initial market capitalization 
at an IPO date, calculated as the offer price times the number of shares offered. 
The fraction of shares issued will be calculated as the ratio of shares issued in the 
IPO to all existing shares. Depending on the information in the prospectuses, we 
might also categorize the announced goals of the IPOs. The rank of the 
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underwriter will be determined by the number of IPOs in the sample in which it 
was a lead underwriter. Finally, in order to control for time variation in 
underpricing, we might consider including year dummy variables. 
We will use a pricing mechanism dummy variable (encoded as “1” for 
bookbuilding, and “0” for the fixed-price mechanism) to examine its effect on the 
amount and variance of underpricing after controlling for the effects of other 
variables discussed above. We may consider including both level variables, as 
well as natural logarithms of variables in order to allow for non-linarites in 
relations. Therefore, the following multivariate regression models will be 
estimated: 
                                                 
                                                             
(As was pointed out before, we might consider constructing the variance 
of underpricing variable as squared residuals from the first regression model) 
Then, we will proceed with two logit models to estimate the probabilities 
of the selection of bookbuilding and fixed-price procedure, depending on the 
variables discussed above. This will allow us to learn the determinants of the 
pricing mechanism choice in Norwegian IPOs.  
As Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue, OLS estimates may not be BLUE 
if a pricing mechanism choice is in fact endogenous. Thus, at this stage we will 
allow for endogeneity of the pricing mechanism choice. We will use exogenous 
variables (the ones that turned out to be insignificant in explaining underpricing 
efficiency) from previous multivariate regressions, and use them to construct 
corresponding logit models for bookbuilding and fixed-price. We will use logit 
regression coefficients to predict probabilities of the pricing mechanism choice for 
each IPO in the sample. We will then use these predicted probabilities in order to 
replace the dummy variables in the previous multivariate models. This will allow 
us to implement the endogeneity of the pricing mechanism choice, and check the 
robustness of our results.  
If we have enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no significant 
link between the pricing mechanisms and underpricing after controlling for other 
variables, we will then study how a particular pricing mechanism performs with 
respect to controlling the amount and variability of underpricing, using a cross-
section of bookbuilt and fixed-priced IPOs independently. This will also allow us 
to test the relationships between the characteristics of the issuer, the issue, market 
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conditions and underpricing. To implement this, multivariate regression models, 
constructed in a similar manner as the initial ones (though obviously without a 
pricing mechanism dummy), will be analysed.  
If we find a statistically significant impact of the market return and 
volatility on underpricing, we will extend the analysis of the pricing mechanisms‟ 
efficiency to various market conditions, particularly “hot” versus “cold” markets. 
Most likely, we will sort the dataset into several market “hotness” quintiles and 
perform corresponding regression analyses in each of them. Lastly, to confirm the 
robustness of the results in our research, we might want to consider the initial 
returns over a longer period, for instance 10 days. 
 
Data 
For the purpose of the current research, we will need a dataset on IPOs, 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. To construct the dataset, we will gather the 
information about characteristics of the firms going public (industry, age, book-to-
market ratio), and characteristics of the issue (offer price, number of shares issued, 
number of existing shares, goal of the IPO, identity of the underwriter, pricing 
mechanism used).  
Most of these data we intend to obtain from the IPO prospectuses and IPO 
database, provided by the Department of Financial Economics at BI Norwegian 
Business School. We are aware that there might be a need to update this database 
by including recent IPOs, which we intend to do. 
We will also need the market data, such as stock prices time series and 
stock market indexes (particularly OBX), which we will obtain from the Oslo 
Stock Exchange. We also consider using comprehensive databases, such as 
Thomson Reuters DataStream, and reliable sources of information, such as 
companies‟ websites, if there will be a need to verify the dataset.   
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